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ABSTRACT

JAPAN: REGIME CHANGE IN THE “LOST DECADE”

by

Tang Suk On Fiona

Master of Philosophy

The shift in both the political and economic situations of Japan in the post1993s caught the attention of observers because the abrupt changes were unparalleled
in other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries. Politically, a single conservative party had dominated Japan’s electoral
and government spheres in a way unmatched in any other industrialized democracy
two-to-one majorities over the next largest party; complete control of all cabinet
posts; and a relatively large influence of government over the economy.
Economically too, Japan’s rapid growth had also been without parallel and had put it
at the head of the countries called the “Asian dragons”. The national growth rates of
Japan were also double those of other OECD countries in the postwar period; labour
productivity in manufacturing and industry was far greater; unemployment and
inflation were dramatically lower; saving rates of people remained consistently
higher; and overseas investments and holdings exploded more dramatically. All these
successes had shocked the rest of the world.

However, the loss of the dominance by the LDP and the end of the high
growth of Japan's economy in the early 1990s contributed to what many Japanese
have come to call the 'lost decade' and resulted in serious debates over the political
and economic direction of Japan.

This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. A theoretical model of
regime change will be used to analyze the political and economic shift of Japan.
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Chapter One

Main theme of this Study

1.

Introduction

In the 1990s Japan’s political economy was sharply different from what it had
been two or three decades earlier. Thirty-eight years of electoral dominance by the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had ended with the party’s internal fragmentation.
The early 1990s seemed to have finally brought vindication to the perennial losers –
the opposition parties. In 1989, the LDP lost an election and control of the House of
Councilors (HC) of the Japanese Diet (Japan’s national legislature). This was
followed in 1993 by the LDP losing control of the House of Representatives (HR),
and by the first non-LDP government since the party’s formation in 1955. In July
1993, an eight-party coalition supplied Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister since
1955.

Although the LDP remerged as the nation’s largest party and regained cabinet
control following elections in 1996, it was not the same party it had been, nor did it
enjoy any of its once sweeping dominance (Pempel, 1993, p. 175). Economically, the
changes were equally striking. Four decades of unprecedented growth from the early
1950s until the end of the 1980s came to an end with the simultaneous collapse of
both stock and land prices, the collapse of numerous financial institutions, and at
least $600 billion in unrecoverable loans (Pempel, 1998, p.212).

The shift in both the political and economic situations of Japan caught the
attention of observers because the abrupt changes were unparalleled in other
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in the
postwar period. Politically, a single conservative party had dominated Japan’s
electoral and government spheres in a way unmatched in any other industrialized
democracy two-to-one majorities over the next largest party; complete control of all
cabinet posts; and a relatively large influence of government over the economy.
Economically too, Japan’s rapid growth had also been without parallel and had put it
1

at the head of the countries called the “Asian dragons”. The national growth rates of
Japan were also double those of other OECD countries in the postwar period; labour
productivity in manufacturing and industry was far greater; unemployment and
inflation were dramatically lower; saving rates of people remained consistently
higher; and overseas investments and holdings exploded more dramatically. All these
successes had shocked the rest of the world.

However, the loss of the dominance by the LDP and the end of the high growth
of Japan's economy in the early 1990s contributed to what many Japanese have come
to call the 'lost decade' and resulted in serious debates over the political and
economic direction of Japan.

This thesis’s research questions, therefore, are (i) to examine the extent to which
change has really occurred in the 1990s and (ii) to find out whether the change that
Japan underwent in the 1990s can be considered as a ‘regime change’ (by utilising a
theoretical model of regime change). The definitions of ‘regime’ and ‘regime change’
will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, but the starting point will be the
definition that the “regime consists of all those arrangements that regulate the way in
which the demands put into the system are settled and the way in which decisions are
put into the effect. They are the so-called rules of the game, in the light of which
actions by members of the system are legitimated and accepted by the bulk of
members as authoritative” (Easton, 1957, p.392). The working model of ‘regime
change’ includes three main pillars, namely the domestic political institutions, public
policy paradigm and socio-economic coalition. Detailed examination will be put on
the description and analysis of changes happening in these three main pillars in
Japan.

This thesis uses a qualitative research methodology. A theoretical model of
regime change will be used to analyze the political and economic shift of Japan. I
will analyze the content and context of the changes of Japan through a literature
review from materials including books, journals, newspapers and internet sources in
order to clarify the political and economic changes of Japan. Qualitative
Historical-Comparative

research

approach

will

be

used,

as

the

Historical-Comparative research is suited for questions in which combinations of
2

factors produce a specific outcome. It is also appropriate for comparing entire
systems, and to study long-term social change. Gobin (1998) states that the historical
- comparative approach allows us to analyse such changes and justifies a broader
scope. Comparison, having been considered initially an original and interesting
approach with marginal status, is now beginning to be seen as an essential tool for
generating knowledge. The comparative analysis by placing it within the historical
context helps to generalize the knowledge in the present-day context through the
study of past or particular time frame in the past.

This research uses a historically-grounded comparative approach to examine the
historical pre-conditions that underpinned the formation of LDP one party dominance
regime, and then contrasts them with the conditions shaping the new coalition
government regime of today. Given that the overall rules of the game in regimes are
very different in the pre-1990s and post-1990s periods, the change of rules of the
game ultimately generate the new relationships and structures of regime. Going
beyond the comparative approach typology to place it within a strategic vision by
placing emphasis on three components in the regime - the political institutions, the
socio-economic coalition and the public policy paradigm - could draw a clear picture
of the extent of regime change in Japan. With the guidance of the regime change
model, a more comprehensive picture on the changes of Japan could be presented.

In this thesis, the remainder of this chapter introduces the purpose of my
research, the different levels of analysis and the importance of the concept of
“political regime”, the literature review on the political system and political regime
and, most importantly, the theoretical framework of regime changes. The second
chapter discusses the political institutions of Japan from the post-war period to the
early 2000s, focusing on the period from LDP dominance to the LDP-led
government. The third chapter focuses on explaining the changes of the
socio-economic conditions of Japan. The fourth chapter introduces the public policy
paradigm and its changes in Japan in those two particular periods of time. The final
chapter is the conclusion which summarizes my whole research. The references of
my research are attached at the back.

3

2.

Purpose of the research and levels of analysis

There have been many scholars writing on the Japan’s political and economic
development since the World War II, especially discussing the dominance of the LDP
in Japan for 38 years and the recession in Japan’s economy since the early 1990s.
However, the discussion often lacks a theoretical framework as a core structure for
analysis. There is a need for a systematic approach to analyze the changes of the
Japan’s political and economic development.

As stated by Goldstein (1999, p.76), a level of analysis is a perspective of
investigation based on a set of similar actors or processes that suggests possible
explanations to “why questions”. Level of analysis can be divided into three levels –
individual, national and international level. In this research, I will focus on the
national level of analysis, which is concerned with the change in core elements of the
political regime in Japan. The core elements of the regime would be elaborated later
in this chapter. Before moving on to examining whether Japan has undergone a
change in “political regime”, the difference between political system and political
regime should be addressed first.

3.

The literature review on the importance of political system in political
science

When considering “political regime”, since the term is so ambiguous and
difficult to define within clear boundaries and scopes, it is to a certain extent mixed
up with the concept of political system. In common sense, system should include
input, process and output, but the definition on what is “political system” is more
complex and should need more explanations of the meaning. Through the discussion
of the meaning of a “political system”, it is possible that the correlations between
“political regime” and “political system” could be explored.

The most authoritative author regarding the political system may be Easton,
who wrote an article entitled the “An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems”
(1957). He argued that if “we hold the system of political actions as a unit before our
4

mind’s eye, as it were, we can see that what keeps the system going are inputs of
various kinds. These inputs are converted by the processes of the system into outputs
and these, in turn, have consequences both for the system and for the environment in
which the system exists” (Easton, 1957, p.384). The formula is very simple and also
very illuminating: inputs – political system or processes – outputs. Please refer to the
following Figure 1. It is a model regarding the approach to the study of political life.

Figure 1: An analysis of political system

DEMANDS
INPUT
SUPPORT

DECISIONS
A
POLITICAL
SYSTEM

OUTPUT
OR POLICIES

ENVIRONMENT
FEEDBACK
Political systems have certain properties; they contain (1) Properties of identification;
(2) Inputs and outputs; (3) Differentiation within a system; (4) Integration of a
system.

The properties of identification distinguish a political system from other social
systems, and we must be able to identify it by describing its fundamental units and
establishing the boundaries that demarcate it from units outside the system. The
properties of identification include units of a political system and the boundaries. The
units are the elements of the system, while the boundaries were defined by all those
actions more or less directly related to the making of binding decisions for the
society; every social action that does not contain of this characteristic will be
excluded from the system and thereby will automatically be viewed as an external
variable in the environment (Easton, 1957, p. 385).

The input of a system include demand and support (as shown in Figure 1), As
Easton (1957, p.387) stated “the reason why a political system emerges in a society
at all – that is , why men engage in political activity – is that demands are being
5

made by persons or groups in the society that cannot all be fully satisfied.” The
demand of a political system may rise from internal and external forces. External
force means that the international environment encourages the domestic actors in a
nation to react, while internal force means the political relationships of the members
themselves may change as a result of dissatisfaction stemming from these
relationships. Suffice it to say, the demand as a major type of input of political
systems constitutes a significant part of the material upon which the system operates.

Inputs of demands alone are not enough to keep a political system operating.
The input of demand should be matched with support in the system so that the
demands could be satisfied or conflicts in goals composed. The support of one party
to another party means that A acts on behalf of or when it orients itself favorably
toward B’s goals, interests and actions. It may consist of actions promoting the goals,
interests, and actions of another person. Support of a political system should be
taking place in the three areas: which are the political community, the regime and the
government (Easton, 1957, 400).

The meaning of supporting and non-supporting of political community turned
on whether there was sufficient mutual identification among the members of the
system for them to be able to work together as a political community. Thus in any
political system, the degree of being one group feeling and to the extent that the
members of the system identify one another as a part of this unit such as territoriality,
kinship, or citizenship, we would say that they are putting in support for the political
community.

Political regime relates to some rules, norms, principles, arrangements and
institutions that govern the rules of the game. However, since the concept of political
regime is still quite large, it is difficult to identify what are the most important sets of
arrangements and institutions and, most importantly, how the changes in these sets
contributed to the “regime change” of the research focus.

Regarding the government, if a political system is going to be able to handle the
conflicting demands put into it, not only must the members of the system be prepared
to support the settlement of these conflicts in common and possess some consensus
6

with regard to the rules governing the mode of settlement; they must also be ready to
support a government as it undertakes the concrete tasks involved in negotiating such
settlements; they must also be ready to support a government as it undertakes the
concrete task involved in negotiating such settlements (Easton, 1957, p.396).

4.

The literature review on the importance of regimes in political science

As we have mentioned beforehand, regime can be divided into two levels of
analysis – the international level and the national level.

It should be noted that the definitions of “regime” in the literature have been
quite ambiguous and most of them have just defined as a set of rules, norms and
principles, arrangements and institutional matters that governed the society and
contributed to the overall harmony and cooperation of the socio-political economy.
Puchala and Hopkins (1983, p.256) stated that a regime is an attitudinal phenomenon.
Behaviour follows from adherence to principles, norms, and rules, which legal codes
sometime reflect. But regimes themselves are subjective: they exist primarily as
participants’ understandings,

expectations

or

convictions

about

legitimate,

appropriate or moral behaviour. Keohane and Kye (1977, p.19) defined regimes as “a
set of governing arrangements” and include “networks of rules, norms, and
procedures that regularize behaviour and control its effects”.

Haas argues that a

regime encompasses a mutually coherent set of procedures, rules and norms (Ernst,
1980, p.403). Krasner (1983, p.112) also defined a regime as “implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations coverage in a given area of the society” and stated that a fundamental
distinction must be made between principles and norms on the one hand, the rules
and procedures on the other. Principles and norms provide the basic defining
characteristics of a regime. There may be many rules and decision-making
procedures that are consistent with the sample principles and norms. Principles are
beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in
terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and
implementing collective choice. This usage is consistent with other recent
7

formulations.

In fact, it must be understood that regimes are not short-term or temporary
arrangements that will be easy to change with every shift in power of interests.
Keohane points out that a basic analytic distinction must be made between regimes
and agreements. Agreements are ad hoc, often “one-shot”, arrangements. The
purpose of regimes is to facilitate agreements. Jervis (1982, p.371) argued that the
concept of regimes imply not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation,
but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest.
Similarly, regime-governed behaviour must not be based solely on short-term
calculations of interest. Since regimes encompass principles and norms, the utility
function that is being maximized must embody some sense of general obligation.

At the international level, it is noted that the importance of international regime
in explaining the state behaviour has arrested attention starting from the 1970s.
Young (1980, p.331) stated that “rising interest in the concept of international regime
in the 1970s is much like that accorded to international system in the 1950s”. As
Haggard and Simmons (1987, p. 498) argued, “over the last ten years, international
regimes emerged as a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within
international relations”. It has become intellectually fashionable to speak and write
about regimes. Some authors have identified international political and economic
conditions that may affect political regimes, including colonial legacies (Collier,
1982), and economic dependence (Bollen, 1983). The earlier interpretation on the
meaning of “international regime” could be found from the article written by both
Young (1980, p.346) and Ernst (1980, p.553), in which they defined “regime” as a
“norms, rules and procedures agreed to in order to regulate an issue-area”. Puchala
and Hopkins (1983, p.61) argued that “a regime exists in very substantive issue-area
in international relations, wherever there is regularity in behaviour, some kinds of
principles, norms or rules must exist to account for it”, and regimes constrain and
regularize the behaviour of participants, affect which activities are legitimized or
condemned, and influence whether, when, and how conflicts are resolved.

At the national level, Easton (1957, p. 383) argued that regime served to channel
political action within a system and give it meaning. A description of a regime must
8

include a characterization of the major principles it upholds and each regime has a
set of elites who are the practical actors within it, for instance, the government of
nation-states are the prime official members. More concretely, regime participants
are most often bureaucratic units or individuals who operate as parts of the
“government” by creating, enforcing or otherwise acting in compliance with norms.
Fishman (1990, p.41) stated that “a regime may be thought of as the formal and
informal organization of the centre of political power, and of its relations with the
broader society. A regime determines who has access to political power, and how
those who are in power deal with those who are not”. His definition has implications
for the issue of regime type, which involves making distinctions among concepts
such as democracy, totalitarianism, and authoritarianism. Actually, authors have used
the term of “regime” to describe the particular constitutional system of a government
(O’Donnell, 1973; 1978; 1988) and many countries have been regarded as
undergoing a kind of regime change, for instance Turkey, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka
changed from democratic to semi-democratic regimes. O’Donnell (1973, p.6) stated
that the political regime will change due to the socioeconomic conditions; other
authors, for example Vanhanen (1990, p.193), argued that besides socioeconomic
conditions social-structural conditions such as societal homogeneity, low or moderate
inequality, a relatively even distribution of power among societal groups are factors
that contributed to the changes and towards democracy (a regime type).

It is noted

that since Japan had already been changed to a democracy after 1945, it has not
undergone such a kind of regime change during the period under study here and
thereby Japan cannot be regarded as a regime change in the way we apply this
definition into our study. There are many subtypes in the democratic system, as
argued by Huntington (1968, p. 298), the character of political institutions also affect
political regime, for instance, under democratic regimes, institutional features that
promote stability and compromise are widely important to facilitate the persistence
of democracy.

At the national level, regime can be divided into different domains. For the
regime related to constitutional order, most typical regime change is from the
authoritarian domain to the democracy domain; the typical domains for which regime
is related to the relationship between political and economic sectors are from
corporatism to non-corporatism, or from mercantilism to liberalism. Last but not
9

least, for the regime that relates to the party system, which will be used in this
current research, the focus on the national level will be from single party dominance
to coalitional government.

5.

The literature review on regime change in political science

Moving now to the literature on regime change, Krasner (1983, p. 318) pointed
out changes in rules and decision-making procedures are changes within regimes
provided that principles and norms are unaltered. He cited an example regarding the
increase of private bank financing in United States during the 1970s but this only
showed a change in the rules but it did not mean that there has been a fundamental
change in the regime. Changes in principles and norms are changes of the regime
itself. However, whether the changes are in rules and decision-making procedures or
in principles and norms as well is difficult to define and can be subject to subjective
interpretations. Such assessments are never easy because they cannot be based on
objective behavioral observations. And Krasner (1983, p.330) stated that finally if the
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of a regime become less
coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with principles, norms,
rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened. In sum, change within a regime
involves alterations of rules and decision-making procedures, but not of norms or
principles; change of a regime involves alteration of norms and principles; and
weakening of a regime involves incoherence among the components of the regime or
inconsistency between the regime and related behaviour.

Other scholars have also written on the concept of “regime change”. Puchala
and Hopkins (1983, p. 125) stated that regimes change substantively in at least two
different ways: one preserve norms while changing principles; the other overturns
norms in order to change principles. Regimes may change qualitatively because
those who participate in them change their minds about interests and aims. They
called it as evolutionary change, because it occurs within the procedural norms of the
regime, usually without major changes in the distribution of power among
participants. Such change, undisturbing to the power structure and within the
regime’s “rules of the game”, is rather conceptual and characteristic mainly of
10

functionally-specific regimes.

By contrast, revolutionary change is more common.

Most regimes function to the advantage of some participants and to the disadvantage
of others. The disadvantaged accept regime principles and norms because the costs of
noncompliance are understood to be higher than the costs of compliance. The
evolutionary and revolutionary regime change provides insight on the possible
explanations of regime change in Japan.

Besides, theoretical approaches to regime change and variance were also
explained. Haggard and Simmons (1987, p. 492) stated that the regime development
and change can be grouped into four categories: structural, game-theoretic, function
and cognitive. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and the most persuasive
interpretations are likely to draw from more than one theoretical tradition. In fact,
most of the structural, game-theoretic and functional theories of regimes are
state-centered, presuming unified rational actors, even if the assumption is related to
gain explanatory leverage (Keohane, 1984, p.97). The structural explanations
represented by hegemonic stability theory, it showed that how international
conditions define the possibilities for cooperation. Structuralists argue that we cannot
infer national policies from intentions because structures tend to “persuade” state
behaviour toward a common quality of outcomes even though the efforts and aims of
agents and agencies vary (Keohane, 1984; Waltz, 1979). Haggard and Simmons
(1987, p.503) stated that the theory of hegemonic stability offers the most
parsimonious and widely employed explanation of regime dynamics; it links regime
creation and maintenance to a dominant power’s existence and the weakening of
regimes to waning hegemony.

This part has revealed the definition of political regime, what contributes to the
regime changes, the types of regime change and theories in explaining regime change.
In fact, it should be noted for the purposes of this study that the definition of regimes
would based on the general definition that regime is a sets of rules, decision-making
procedures, principles, and norms. However, as the literature showed, changes in
rules and decision-making do not result in a regime change but only result in a
change within a regime, whereas the changes in principles and norms do contribute
to a change of a regime. Therefore, the literature review provides insights into the
basis for judging whether Japan has changed in terms of its rules and
11

decision-making procedures or norms and principles.

The definition of political regime has been revealed from the literature, but, still,
it is rather difficult to distinguish three parts: (1) How to assess whether the changes
are “rules and decision-making procedures” and “principles and norms”? (2) Will the
changes in “rules and decision-making procedures” result in the changes of
“principles and norms”? (3) What are the institutional arrangements that relate rules,
decision-making procedures, principles and norms? Specifically, what are the
elements, arrangements and institutional settings of a regime? The previous literature
reviews are not able to provide all the answers on specifying some core elements of a
regime; however, they are obviously essential in the current study.

Pempel (1992; 1997) has given insights on the core elements within a regime
and has provided some discussion on regime and the Japanese political economy. As
one of the few scholars to apply the concept of “regime” to the Japanese case,
moreover, the ideas of Pempel can provide insight for the theoretical development of
the current study. He stated that regime involves a sustained fusion between the
institutions of the state and particular segments of the socio-economic order.
Moreover, the regime is the expectation that specific components of state and
societal power will be mutually reinforcing and that public actions will reflect the
character of this interaction. In short, a regime’s character will be determined by the
societal coalition on which a state rests, the formal powers of that state, and by the
institutionalization and bias of the public policies that result.

More specifically, the core domains constitute a domestic regime. The major
elements constituting a regime according to Pempel, are 1) the character of the
socio-economic coalition that rules the country; 2) the political and economic
institutions through which power is acquired and exercised; and 3) the public policy
profile that gives broad political direction to the nation. Each has its own analytic
autonomy, yet at the same time, all three interact with one another in reinforcing and
overlapping ways. In combination, they constitute Japan’s political economic
“regime”. The consequence of change is almost certain to be the creation of a new
regime that will be based on revised socio-economic coalitional arrangements,
modified political institutions, and uncharted directions for public policy.
12

He further analyzed the concept of “regime”. He stated that a regime involves a
sustained fusion among three things: political institutions, particular segments of the
socio-economic order, and a specific mixture of public policies. Within democracies,
the character of this fusion – that is, the nature of a regime – is mediated in important
ways by a regularized pattern of political and economic interactions that are
synergistic in character: all three traits of a regime feed into and reinforce one
another. In this sense, regime equates with a particular social order.

Pempel (1998) in his book defines clearly the nature of regime and the core
elements of a regime which are essentially important in drawing up the theoretical
framework. The term “regime” refers to a middle level of cohesion in the political
economy of a nation-state. A regime is far less sweeping and comprehensive than a
“political system” (which has been explained in previous section), “constitutional
order” or “economic system”. At the same time, the character of a regime usually
transcends several specific administrations, presidencies, cabinets, and is more
comprehensive than any time-bound economic direction such as deficit-finance,
balanced budgets or loose money, and a regime is composed of three essential
elements: political institutions, public policy paradigm and socioeconomic coalitions.
These three overlap and reinforce one another; they resemble the three legs of a
tripod that may collapse when any one is removed. They interact in complex ways,
developing and responding to a discrete internal logic.

A stable regime consists of mutually reinforcing relationships among three sets
of variables: the major political institutions, public policy and the socioeconomic
coalitions. More tangibly, such regimes are characterized by the broadly consistent
direction in which the country proceeds (its public policy), by the groups that
empower – and are empowered by – this movement (its socioeconomic alliances),
and by the regularized organizations of decision-making through which it channels
and manifests such power (its political and economic institutions). All three
components are constantly reinforcing and sustaining one another through “virtuous
circles” or “positive synergies”. Predictability becomes more problematic and
equilibrium is undermined in the forces of regime change. Such a spiral must be
corrected by internal adjustments; if the action and responses are not able to tackle
the internal adjustments, the regime will eventually collapse, and a new differently
13

ordered regime may emerge.

The concept of “regime change” is a good model to apply in the study of post1980s Japanese politics, which has been a transitional period. The regime change
model helps to outline the main pillars for the analysis and enables us to compare the
extent of whatever changes have occurred between the two different regimes.

6.

Main Theoretical Framework of Thesis

The current research would like to focus on whether Japan has undergone a
regime change in the 1990s. Drawing from the insights of the literature review, the
conceptual flow of the regime model could be defined in the following aspects:
a.

Regime is different from political system (Easton, 1957, p.389)

b.

Regime is a set of rules, decision-making procedures, norms, principles and the
so-called rules of the game

c.

Regime also refer to all the arrangements and institutions that regulate the way
in which the demands put into the system are settled and the way in which
decisions are put into effect.

d.

Regime includes primarily political institutions, public policy paradigm and
socioeconomic coalitions. The change in these aspects of a nation means the
change in regime in that nation.

e.

The core elements of regime interact in complex ways, developing and
responding with each other, thus forming a mutually reinforcing relationship.
The change in socio-economic coalition will lead to the change of political
institutions and public policy, and the other way round is also true.

f.

The regime change of a nation does not happen in a vacuum, the external
environment / international environment would create impacts on the change of
a regime, and will create change in the core element of a regime, which would
trigger the change of another core element.

In the research, regime is defined as the whole system of political institutions/
organisations, socio-economic coalitions and the structure-supporting elements,
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whose power has secured extensive obedience, stable and successive control in a
society. This indicates that regime has, on one hand, a static, institutionalized
character, and on the other, it involves a kinetic phase. In other words, when a regime
as a system of the elements is formed, an interaction among the elements comes into
existence, which induces a change in the formula of the system, which can in turn
cause regime change. If the regime changed, it would be conceivable that the
behavioral pattern of the actors, including that of a state, will undergo change. And a
change of the regime has an influence upon the life of millions of people, creating a
spectrum of feelings from terror to hope and creating new rules of the game.

This study focuses on ‘the process of change’ and ‘the structure supporting the
process of regime change’ in Japan. Needless to say, we should undertake
comparative efforts to make the definition of regime and regime change more
meaningful. The research on the regime change of Japan in this thesis can be one of
the significant positive cases in the development of the literature in this field.

Please refer to Figure 2 for the theoretical framework of a regime change.
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Figure 2: A theoretical framework of a regime change
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Figure 2 is the theoretical framework which I have drawn from the literature
review of the concept of regime and how it could be used to examine the possible
regime change in my research studies. In the theoretical model, it is assumed that the
changes in the three main pillars will result in changes of the nation into a new
regime. Furthermore, all three pillars are interlocking with each other and thereby
one change will lead to change of another. Without the changes in all three pillars,
there will not be a new regime formation. In the following chapters, the detailed
changes in each pillar will be discussed, and the interrelations between them will be
explained.

In the research, although it is possible to identify the changes in the three pillars
between the 1955-1993 period and the 1993-early 2000s period, it is a limitation
that the analysis of the dynamic interactions between these three pillars cannot be
covered to the same extent within this framework. Constraints of space and time
also mean that a number of issues, such as why the first anti-LDP government
emerged in 1993, why those former LDP ‘enemies’ were willing to ally with the
LDP after 1994, and why the Murayama government failed to maintain its power in
1996, cannot be covered in detail in this research. They will be good research
questions for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO

Political Institutions in Japan: Comparison between pre-1993 and post-1993
periods

Pempel (1997, p.347) argued that the Japanese political economy is indeed
undergoing transformations. These are occurring at what might be thought of as a
national level of politics and economics, one far deeper than the ever-recurring shifts
in personalities and party strengths, but far less comprehensive than the kinds of
totalistic shifts involved in a transition of authoritarianism to parliamentary
democracy. The party system domain will be used to test out national level regime
change.

The year of 1993 was a critical year for the development of the political system
in Japan since the political system of Japan underwent a great change in that year.
From 1955 to 1993 was a LDP one party dominance regime with close connection
with the American government in its foreign policy and heavy reliance on the close
relationships with the agriculture sector, bureaucracy and the business sector in
maintaining the stability of the government. The loss of the dominance rule of the
LDP in 1993 in the HR election was a sudden change of its long-standing control of
the political system. As discussed in chapter one, the theoretical framework
suggested by Pempel (1997, 1998) has argued that a change in the political
institutions was one of the factors contributing to the change of the regime of a
nation. In this chapter, the extent of the changes of the political institutions of Japan
will be discussed in detail with explanations on why such a change happened in
1993.
Political institutions – the typical subject of political science - are considered
both in the sense of rules of the political game and as political organizations acting
within that framework. Our main concerns in the research will be political parties,
electoral rules, elections and parliaments, as well as the electoral, policy, coalition
and strategic criteria used by political actors constrained by institutional rules.
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As Lindblom (1994, p. 58) has argued that in all the political systems of the
world, much of politics is economics, and most of economics is politics. Clark (1998,
p.9) too suggests that although the economy is usually viewed as an economic
institution, it also performs important functions in achieving the political goal. In the
case of Japan, we can find that the economic stagnation was one of the strong causes
for regime change. Therefore, in the following research, the political economy,
including political institutions and the economic situation, will also be covered.

In the last decade, at least two essentials elements of the old regime have been
that undergoing change. First, on the political level, the 38 years of dominance by the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ended with the party’s internal fragmentation, its
loss of a parliamentary majority and executive control, the eight-party coalition that
made Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister since the party’s formation in 1955 and
the introduction of a new electoral system for the HR of the Diet in 1994.

Second, on the economic front, Japan’s seemingly endless string of
achievements from the early 1950s until the end of the 1980s came to a halt as a
result of the bursting of the economic “bubble” and the simultaneous collapse of
stock, land prices and a number of substantial financial institutions. These
represented a dramatic turnaround from the economic success that had previously
happened in the national economy.

Based on this background, the chapter will start by outlining the pre-1993
political institutions by discussing the major political parties in Japan, particularly
the nature and formation of the LDP. In explaining the LDP one-party dominance
regime, the factionalism politics, the electoral system and why there was a monopoly
by the LDP in elections for so long in Japan would also be examined. After
discussing the pre-1993 political institutions in Japan, analysis will focus on the new
regime from 1993 to the present, which began in 1993 with the splits in the LDP. It
will be argued that the major change in political institutions in Japan was a change
from LDP One-party dominance to a government of LDP-led coalitions. Events
leading to why there was such a change will be discussed and the factors contributing
to such a coalition rule will be raised. In describing the changes in the LDP one-party
dominance regime in the post-1993 period, the Japan’s new electoral system,
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including the rules that regulated the formation of smaller parties, issues related to
dual candidates and identical ranking, restrictions on fundraising activities, and how
the new electoral laws affected the factional politics in Japan. All these rules of the
game changes contributed to a regime change in Japan.

1. Political institutions in the pre-1993 period

1.1 Major political parties in Japan
The six major political parties in pre-1993 Japan were the ruling Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP), the Japan Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party
(Minshato), the United Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshu Rengo), the
Komeito, the Japan Communist Party, while temporarily there existed the New
Liberal Club (Shin Jiyu Kurabu), an offshoot of the LDP, rejoining the ruling party in
year 1986 (Kishimoto, 1988, p97).

The LDP is a confederation of conservative forces that functions essentially as a
coalition of factions (which will be discussed later). It was the national-level ruling
party of Japan throughout the entire the period between 1955 and 1993. Among the
political systems of non-Socialist developed nations, Japan is unique in comparison
with other western democratic countries, for except for a short period after World
War II when a Socialist-centered coalition government ruled Japan in 1947-1948,
conservative parties have dominated. After November 1955, when two conservative
parties (Democratic and Liberal parties) merged to form the LDP, conservative rule
was concentrated within that single organization and the LDP maintained its rule as
the governing party for thirty-eight years (Hrebenar, 2000; Bouissou, 2002). Since
1955, although it sometimes lost seats, the conservative LDP held a lion’s share of
the seats in both the HC and the HR for 38 years.

The left-and right-wing factions of Japan Socialist Party (JSP), were reunited in
October 1955, the same year that the conservatives joined together as the LDP. It was
the second largest party and the number one oppositional party in the pre-1993 Japan
political system.

At the time of the two mergers the JSP was approximately half the

size of the LDP and thoroughly dominated the opposition forces. However, a number
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of reasons appeared from the 1960’s (including a rigid platform, internal disputes,
and the emergence of competing opposition parties), which resulted in the gradual
decline of the JSP (Kishimoto, 1998; Curtis, 1999; Hrebenar, 2000; Masumi, 1995;
Bouissou, 2002).

The Democratic Socialist Party, formed in January 1960, and the United Social
Democratic Party, formed in March 1978, were both moderate progressive parties
established by former right-wing JSP members who split away from the JSP
(Kishimoto, 1998). The Komeito (also known as Clean Government Party) ,

formed

in 1964 as the political arm of the Soka Gakkai, a Buddhist lay organization, is
usually classified as a centrist party. Hrebenar (2000, p.191) claimed the Komeito’s
policy positions were “humanitarian socialism and middle-of-the-road reformism”.
Since the mid-1980s these three moderate opposition parties, along with the
increasingly pragmatic JSP, have been cooperating in national elections (Kishimoto,
1998; Masumi, 1995; Bouissou, 2002).

The Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was established in July 1922 but operated
underground until it was legalized after WWII. It reorganized itself in 1958 on the
principle of “self-reliance and independence”, with close interactions and
connections with China and the Soviet Union. Its policy stances are for formulating a
flexible, nonviolent platform and adopt a positive stance toward parliamentary
government. However, due to its ideology of being communist-oriented, it was
implicitly undermined by the United States government and it remained at odds with
the other opposition parties, becoming increasingly isolated both at home and abroad.
Therefore, in spite of being highly organized and reliably-financed, the party has not
expanded since the mid-1970s (Kishimoto, 1998, p177).

The New Liberal Club (NLC) was formed due to the LDP’s inadequate response
to the side effects of rapid economic growth and to some major changes in the
international environment, as well as disenchantment over the ethical problems
raised by incidents like the Lockheed scandal. As a result, in June 1976, it was the
first time for a group of dissidents to split off to form their own party outside the
LDP.
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The above six were the major political parties in Japan in the LDP dominance
regime in the pre-1993 period. There are a number of reasons that contributed to the
dominance of the LDP. Regarding the oppositional parties, besides the strong stance
of the JSP, some new parties continued to form and hold anti-LDP feelings, but since
there were too many personality clashes and conflicts within and between parties, it
was difficult to form strong oppositional forces against LDP, for pre-1993 the
concept of “form/ break-up reform” was limited – it applies much better to post-93
period. No single party could threaten the LDP hegemonic dynasty.

1.2 The nature and formation of LDP

One scholar has written, “the dynamics and the logic of the political system
would be different in the future from what they were during the period of
so-called ’55 system, the long era of LDP dominance that began in 1955 when the
conservative parties came together to form the LDP and the right and left wings of
the socialists party united” (Curtis, 1999, p.45). The LDP’s record is certainly
unprecedented among the ruling democratic parties in the world.

The decision of the conservatives to merge was facilitated by two external
forces. One of these was pressure from “corporate Japan” – what is called the
financial world, or zaikai, including the Federation of Economic Organization
(Keizai Dantai Rengokai), the Japan Federation of Employers’ Association (Nihon
Keieisha Dantai Renmei), the Committee for Economic Development (Keizai
Doyukai), and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Nihon Shoko
Kaigisho). These four groups had called for the merging of the conservatives as early
as 1952. This aspect also provided in the latter period for the formation of the
so-called interdependent “iron-triangle” relationships. Historically, there have been
extremely close ties between conservative parties and corporate Japan. This tight
relationship of cooperative efforts between the government and the zaikai has been
popularly known as “Japan Incorporated”. Businesses, banking and financial
institutions are the top contributors to the LDP. Besides, real estate and construction
industries were the second-largest donors of political funds. The great dependence on
big business resulted in motivations for the zaikai to “force” them to articulate
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clearly on the conflicts and rivalries (Hrebenar, 2000) and thus was instrumental in
uniting various conservative elements into a single party (Jain, 1997, p. 251).

The reasons why the business world, especially the banking community, has
continued to support the LDP more than other parties lies in the fact that the LDP has
helped to provide the most favourable environment for rapid economic expansion.
Japanese postwar economic development has relied on the various levels of
government and especially the private sector. To invest in modern equipment and
factories, corporations had to borrow money from banks and other financial
institutions. With these financial means available, Japanese industries have been able
to scrap archaic facilities and build new and sophisticated plants, often equipped with
the most modern robots. By means of such heavy borrowing, Japanese companies
have been able to produce reliable products that have been very competitive in the
international market.

The second factor promoting the merger of the conservatives was the advance of
the progressive political forces within Japan. The increasing dominant power of the
opposition Right and Left Socialists in the lower house elections in the early 1950s
posed a threat to conservative parties that if they were still divided into two parties,
their position would be sooner or later overwhelmed by the socialist parties. In line
with this argument, Bailey (1996, p.261) stated that the reuniting of the two wings of
the Socialist Party in October 1955 pushed the two conservative parties to effect a
similar arrangement, while Kishimoto (1988, p.179) argued that the common sense
of urgency over the imminent reunification of the Japan Socialist Party and the
enthusiasm for permanent conservative rule (LDP party president will become prime
minister) were crucial.

Burks (1991) has argued that this LDP can not be described either as liberal or
democratic, nor even a party. As a conservative party, the LDP supports a free
capitalist system as the foundation of democratic government and of economic and
social activity. The LDP’s ideology and policies have also been seen as covering
diverse opinion embraced by the party (factionalism), but by utilising the principles
of nonconfrontation and compromise the LDP was able to retain cohesion and remain
dominant.
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2. LDP one-party dominance in the pre-1990s period

2.1 Monopoly of LDP in elections
In the LDP dominance regime, the monopoly of the LDP can be shown by the
seats that the LDP held in the National Diet. The Diet and its operation have been
fully stipulated in the Constitution made by the United States after the WWII.
According to the Constitution, the Diet was Japan’s legislative organ, and according
to the article 41 of the Constitution, it was the “sole law-making organ of the State”
and “the highest organ of state power” (Kishimoto, 1988, p.50-51). The Diet
comprised of the HR and the HC, both of which would consist of elected members,
representatives of all the people.

The number of Diet seats for the HR was 512 and 252 for the HC. The
Constitution prohibits any person from holding a seat in both houses simultaneously.
A full term for office for members of the HR is four years, but it will be cut short
when the house is dissolved by Cabinet. The term of office for members of the House
of Councillors is six years; a regular election for half the members is held every three
years under a separate electoral system.

According to the Constitution, the most important powers vested in the Diet are
those of enacting laws, deciding on the budget, to approving treaties, to designating
the prime minister and passing resolutions of confidence and non-confidence. Other
important powers include the initiation of constitutional amendments. In a
comparison of the two houses, the Constitution stipulated that the HR takes
precedence over the HC.

The prime minister is designated by each house separately in plenary session.
Under Japan’s party system, the leader of the party with a majority in the Diet – or
more precisely, in the HR – is designated prime minister. Therefore in order to
analyze the monopoly of LDP from 1955 to 1993, it was possible to observe the
number of seats in the HR that had been occupied by LDP in that period of time.
Please see Table 1.
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Table 1: Results of House of Representatives elections since the 1958 election (the
major five political parties)
LDP

JSP

Komeito

DSP

JCP

Year 1958 (Seats won)

287

166

N/A

N/A

1

Percent of Vote

57.8

32.9

N/A

N/A

2.6

Year 1960 (Seats won)

296

145

N/A

17

3

Percent of Vote

57.6

27.6

N/A

8.8

2.9

Year 1963 (Seats won)

283

144

N/A

23

5

Percent of Vote

54.7

29

N/A

7.4

4.0

Year 1967 (Seats won)

277

140

25

30

5

Percent of Vote

48.8

27.9

5.4

7.4

4.8

Year 1969 (Seats won)

277

140

25

30

5

Percent of Vote

48.8

27.9

5.4

7.4

4.8

Year 1972 (Seats won)

271

118

29

19

38

Percent of Vote

46.9

21.9

8.5

7.0

10.5

Year 1976 (Seats won)

249

118

29

19

38

Percent of Vote

41.8

21.9

8.5

7.0

10.5

Year 1979 (Seats won)

248

107

57

35

39

Percent of Vote

44.6

19.7

9.8

6.8

10.4

Year 1980 (Seats won)

284

107

33

32

29

Percent of Vote

47.9

19.3

9.0

6.6

9.8

Year 1983 (Seats won)

250

112

58

38

26

Percent of Vote

45.8

19.5

10.1

7.3

9.3

Year 1986 (Seats won)

300

85

56

26

26

Percent of Vote

49.4

17.2

9.4

6.4

8.3

Year 1990 (Seats won)

275

136

45

14

16

Percent of Vote

46.1

24.4

8.0

4.8

8.0

Year 1993 (Seats won)

223

70

51

15

15

Percent of Vote

46.1

24.4

8.0

4.8

8.0

SOURCE:
1.

Kishimoto, K. (1988). Politics in modern Japan: development and organization. Tokyo: Japan
Echo Inc.

2.

Hrebenar, R. J. (1992). Japan’s party system. US: Westview Press.

3.

Rothacher, A. (1993). The Japanese power elite. US: St. Martin’s press Inc.
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The monopoly of the LDP can be found in its election results in the HR since
almost half the seats in every election in the whole period were occupied by it and at
the same time the party leader could become the prime minister. Moreover, from
the table, it is also possible to find out that there were not any one of the opposition
parties was able on its own to exert any serious electoral threat to the LDP, for even
Japan’s four former opposition parties – the Japan Socialist Party, the Japan
Communist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party, and the Komeito – were seen to
flounder helplessly under the complete domination of the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP).1 From its founding in 1955 until 1989, the LDP won every national
election and selected every prime minister and cabinet member.

Other democracies

have had similarly dominant parties, but none of them come close to the LDP in
terms of its longevity in power and its complete dominance of the political scene.
Therefore, in the pre-1993, it was the LDP one-party dominance regime in Japan.

2.2 Reasons for the LDP dominance in the regime of pre-1990s

2.2.1 Electoral system in Japan
Some scholars have argued that the long dominance of the LDP reflected a
strong relationship with the nature of the nation’s electoral laws and its political party
system. The results of one-party dominance regime are not only based on cultural
and historical factors but also on election systems that are conducive to the evolution
of the one-party system, in which the LDP was holding power.

Herbenar (2000, p. 152) stated that the pre-1993 one- party dominance regime
was characterized by an election law based on multi-member parliamentary districts,
chronic mal-apportionment, and a straitjacket campaign activities restriction law. The
net effect of these laws operated to keep Japan in a one-party-dominant position. The
electoral law had been one of the crucial factors contributing to the success of the
LDP. The two most distinguishing characteristics of the old Japanese election system
in the LDP dominance regime were “multi-member districts with single
non-transferable voting (SNTV) and unequal apportionment” (Wada, 1996, p.3).
1

These parties are called the “former” opposition parties because in 1993 three of them lost their
opposition status when they became part of a coalition government.
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Curtis (1999, p.140) stated that “this terminology emphasized the nature of the ballot
on which to write the name of his or her preferred candidate. The vote is single entry
in that the voter can cast a ballot for only one candidate, even though several are
elected to the Diet in the district. It is nontransferable in that there is no formula for
transferring votes that are cast for candidate to another”.

It was also commonly called the medium-sized-district (MSD) electoral system
(in contrast to fewer candidates elected in each district than under the
prefecture-wide “large-size-election-district system” from 1900 to 1920, and more
than the “small-size-election-district system” used for two elections in the early
1920s). Thus in MSD systems, the proportion of the vote that one needs to win a seat
is not fixed, but varies with the competitive situation in the constituency, and thus
varies from constituency to constituency.

Under the electoral system that was used until 1993 the 511 members of the HR
were elected from 129 constituencies. The district magnitude ranged from two to six,
with most districts having between three to five seats. Voters cast a single ballot
regardless of the number of seats in their district. The ballots were counted in each
district. For instance, in a district with four seats, the top four vote-getters would be
elected as Diet members (Abe, 1990). This kind of combination of multimember
districts and single-entry ballots means that any party seeking a Diet majority (256
seats in a 511 member in HR) had to run multiple candidates for the same party to
target their campaigns at voters who supported their party rather than voters who did
not. For example, Hrebenar (2000) stated that the relationship between constituency
magnitude and LDP success was also clear in the 1990 General Election (HR). From
the election result, we can find that the fewer seats elected in a district, the better
success rate the LDP achieved. The LDP won the seat in the single-seat district;
62.5% of the seats in the 2-seat districts; 57.9% in the 3-seat districts; 53.5% in the
4-seat district; 52.6% in the 5-seat district and 33.3% in the 6-seat district. As the
largest party in Japan, the LDP got crucial advantage in the election system in the
LDP one-party dominance regime.

On the other hand, this had in fact created great competition among LDP
candidates (Curtis, 1999, p.87). There was intra-party competition among LDP
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candidates because the party itself did not control the campaigns of its candidates.
Relations between candidates and the party organization were rather like a franchise
system. Perhaps, another important factor that contributed to the success of the LDP
in the election system in the one party dominance regime was its strength in raising
funds from big business for its candidates. Multi-member districts with SNTV are
used in every level of elections in Japan, which are sometimes called “elections
Japanese style” and have often been considered as a “bad system”. 2 The
combination of multi-member districts with SNTV forces LDP politicians to compete
against each other in the same district. Since they must espouse the same party’s
policy, ideological differences become irrelevant and they are led into pork-barrel
politics, which means government spending that is intended to benefit constituents of
a politician in return for their political support, either in the form of campaign
contributions or votes. Typically it involves funding for government programs whose
economic or service benefits are concentrated in a particular area but whose costs are
spread among all taxpayers. Public works projects and agricultural subsidies are the
most commonly cited examples. Moreover, in the election they argue they need more
money to compete with each other. This is typical politicians’ logic to explain that
Japanese “money politics” is not their own invention. Many journalists and political
scientists, including Ishikawa (1981, 1984, 1990), Sakagami (1990), and Iwai (1991)
have also accepted this logic.

Sims (2001, p. 323) argued that LDP, either as a party or through its factions and
Diet members, acquired enormous funds – far beyond the amounts which rival
parties could raise. It is believed that the funds from all sectors of businesses could
be originated from the personnel networks of particularly factions leaders (depending
on the relatively strength of the factions and their influential power in LDP). These
funds generally increased as Japan grew richer and government expenditure
accelerated. Hrebenar (1992, p.6) and Pempel (1998, p.184) stated that in the 1980s
between 40 million yen (for a well-established Diet number) and 200 million yen (for
a newcomer) was needed to ensure election to the House of Representatives; and that
by 1992 a LDP Diet member would require 140 million yen for routine activities in a
non-election year. Therefore, the LDP’s strength in raising funds from big business
2

Ray Christensen, Ending the LDP Hegemony- Party Cooperation in Japan, Honolulu: University of
Hawai’i, 2000
28

sectors for its party is one of the decisive elements in the game of election.

2.3 Factional politics in LDP
Wada (1996, p.75) stated that the electoral rules explain some important features
of Japanese political economy, including LDP’s factional politics and the stable LDP
government.

One of the key characteristics of the LDP’s part system has been factionalism
(Hrebenar, 2000; Bruks, 1991; Curtis, 1999; Rothacher, 1993; Reed, 2003,
Richardson, 1997; Hane, 1996; Koichi 1988; Masumi, 1995; Wada, 1996, Sims 2001;
Allinson, 1997; Thayer, 1969; Baerwald; 1986).

Hrebenar (2000, p.106) stated that “it is impossible to discuss the LDP and its
dynamics without a thorough examination of its factional nature.” In fact, the LDP is
an alliance of factions in which the greater part of the party’s affairs were conducted
by the factions. Most importantly, the factions play a crucial role in the resolution of
party personnel matters: the selection of the party president (who also usually serves
as the nation’s prime minister), the appointment of cabinet ministers, and the naming
of important party officials. The party offered a known name, financial support, and
other assistance to its endorsed candidates, but each candidate was in effect an
independent political entrepreneur with his own local organization and his marketing
strategies.

There were several major factions with the LDP by the early 1990s. The largest
and most powerful in the early 1990s was the Obuchi faction. Originally led by
Tanaka Kakuei, who

was arrested in 1976 on suspicion of having accepted bribes

from the Lockheed Corporation, the faction was then led by Takeshita Noboru who
later became the prime minister of the country after Nakasone Yasuhiro(Kishimoto,
1988, p. 223), before handling over Obuchi Keizo.

Another important group within the LDP is the Kato, or former Miyazawa
faction. This group, led by Miyazawa Kiichi for much of the past several decades,
was an heir to the faction led by Ikeda Hayato, who directed Japan’s period of high
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growth during the 1960s. After Ikeda’s death, the faction was temporarily taken over
by Maeo Shigesaburo and then by Ohira Masayoshi. After Ohira’s death, Suzuki
Zenko had taken over the faction but decided to step down from the premiership in
1982 to Nakasone. Subsequently in 1987 he finally transferred his factional
leadership to Miyazawa, who then passed it on to Kato Koichi in 1998 (Kishimoto,
1988, p177).

Nakasone Yasuhiro, who became the prime minister from 1982 to 1987, led his
own faction, which had about 67 members, but since his faction was so small in size
he was unable to run either the party or the affairs of government by himself. He
simply never could have become party president of head of the government without
the support of the Tanaka and Suzuki factions. In effect, the two supporting factions
had a near-veto power over policies advocated by Nakasone. It was strongly
criticized it as the “Tanaka-Sone Government” (Kishimoto, 1988, p.165), which
exerted sweeping influence in the political system in the pre-1990s period.

Rothacher (1993, p.378) argued that the upkeep of a faction is a costly enterprise.
A faction leader is expected to contribute a large amount of money to his MPs’
election campaigns and to the maintenance of their secretariat and constituency
support organizations (koenkai). The strength of a faction is determined by (a) the
number of faction members returned in an election (which may in turn depend on the
faction’s campaign budget, (b) the successful election of newcomers endorsed by the
party and financed by the faction, (c) the recruitment of independent MPs and (d) the
poaching of MPs from other factions.

In face of the factional nature of the LDP, the abilities of individuals, no matter
how capable, have little if any influence over whether they will receive key political
positions. To this degree, the factions of the LDP form a “system” within the LDP
politics and each faction maintains its own offices and hold meetings at regular
intervals. Thereby, these factions are, in essence, parties within a party, and hence the
LDP must be viewed as composed of several parties. As different with other
opposition parties, factionalism allows the LDP politicians to have wide range of
flexibility to serve different groups without the strong barriers of political ideology.
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Kishimoto (1988, p.143) stated that, originally party factions were groupings of
Diet members of similar background bound by the ties of obligation and debt that
have long played an important role in Japanese political custom. The LDP factions
were massive profit-making organizations that dominated not only the election of
party presidents but also the president-cum-prime minister’s appointment of cabinet
ministers and party officials. They could affect even the outcome of national
elections through their influence over the recognition of official candidates and
through the allocation of campaign funds and other assistance.

Different faction leaders received funds from large businesses in order to
support their campaigns. Each faction leader has very close links with different
bankers and business leaders in order to strengthen their fund-raising ability;
therefore very close cohesion was formed among the business sector and political
party of the “Iron triangle”. This is where the electoral system discussed in the
previous section came into play. It was of the interests of each faction within the LDP
to strive to gain more support for their own candidates instead of for the party as a
whole.

Jain (1997, p.17) stated that the LDP has been a truly “grand coalition” and
“department store”, which could represent a large spectrum of interests of the
Japanese society (Okimoto, 1988). Therefore, the LDP captured wide range of
support by different factions. Internally, factionalism also acted for the restricted use
of power was also a consequence of its own division (this will be discussed in more
detail in later part). Simply speaking, even though the LDP was dominant in the
political system, it involved different factions that barred it from uniting towards a
common aim and goal, except the common interest of being one united party
(Hrebenar, 2000; Curtis, 1999; Reed, 2003). Therefore, any attempt to achieve a
significant change of policy might end up in factional opposition with the LDP. This
helped prevent the internal disaffection (Jain, 1997, p.69) and maintain the stability
of the LDP government in Japan for 38 years long.

2.4 Other reasons for LDP dominance
Besides the monopoly in the election system, Sims (2001, p. 342) also stated
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that “the main cause of the high economic growth rates which marked the 1950s
and ’60s, and to a lesser extent the 1970s and 1980s was effective planning and
guidance by Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)… … and the LDP
was able, at the least, to claim credit for providing stability and not restricting
economic vitality”. This helped the LDP’s success in winning more support than any
of the opposition parties in every age-group, and at all educational and occupational
levels (Editorial comment in Japan Echo, 1978). The sound economic performance in
Japan after postwar recovery till the 1990s reflected that the government and the
LDP were relatively stable and competent in comparison with the “united” or
“unproven” opposition parties.

Another reason was the strong support for the party by a number of highly
influential interest groups, especially the powerful agricultural sector and the
majority of urban and semi-urban middle class voters developing since the nation’s
rapid economic growth and raising affluence. The agricultural cooperatives were the
pillar of the LDP’s hegemony. Bouissou (2002, p.152) argued that “the cooperatives
were essential to control the rural constituencies, which were the LDP’s stronghold.
They could get entire hamlets out to vote, not losing more than a few votes”. The role
of the agricultural cooperatives is discussed in more detail in chapter 3.

In addition, it can be argued that, paradoxically, another internal factor was the
LDP’s restraint in using its power excessively during the stage of dominance.
Because of a traditional preference for consensus and a powerful common goal
because of fear of a return to authoritarianism and aims to strive for economic
prosperity after war, Japanese people in the post-war decades were uneasy about the
government pushing through legislation against the strong opposition of the other
parties. Therefore, rather than present its opponents with the opportunity to invoke
arguments, the LDP often preferred to make a compromise.

Consequently, “No

fewer than 23 percent of the bills which it (the LDP) submitted to the Diet between
1950 and 1990 were withdrawn or postponed because of opposition, while 15 percent
were amended” (Sims, 2001, p.338).

In line with the above underlying reasons, the long-lasting dominance of the
LDP would result in poor results for the opposition parties, thus preventing them
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from demonstrating that they were capable of governing the country. Intuitively, in
spite of the sometimes only average performance of the LDP, the Japanese did not
have confidence that the opposition party could perform better than the LDP and
therefore the opposition party could not put their doctrine and ideology into practice.
This situation became more serious and commonplace once the LDP had held power
over a number of years (Sims, 2001, p.205). Besides the lack of experience in
administration, another point was that the opposition parties seemed to be too weak
against the LDP. Part of the reason was the opposition parties were also limited by
the fact that they were perceived as representing particular interests. Sims (2001,
p.340) argued that “to a lesser extent that Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) was
tarnished by its close association – reflected in its choice of candidates – with the
public-service unions, and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) by its links with
private-sector unions”. The socialists also criticized the LDP as “monopoly
capitalism” and occasionally fought for better wages for workers, but the JSP had
never provided and economic blueprint for the nation (Jain, 1997, p.65). Moreover,
the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) was founded on Marxist ideology and this
created an adverse image amongst the Japanese, especially as the Japanese
government wanted to keep good relations with the democratic United State. Other
opposition parties were similarly either poorly organized or narrowly focused and
therefore contributing to the prolonged rule of the LDP.

Last but not least, a more crucial factor was driven by the Cold War ideological
differences between the US bloc and the Soviet bloc, representing capitalism and
communism. The United States found that Japan was an important strategic ally and
Japan found that the United States was an important protector in the postwar
economic recovery. It was easy to understand that the United States would like to
support a pro-US LDP and oppose a pro-Soviet JSP (Jain, 1997, p.231).

In the pre-1993 period which had been dominated by the LDP, there had been a
number of opposition parties but the situations were that none of them could exert a
threat to the LDP’s position for various reasons. Within the structure of the LDP, it
could be discussed in terms of factionalism, acting like a coalition government, but
all the factions were quite restricted from separating since this would undermine their
powers and interests. The electoral system was also designed in creating the
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factionalism as well as the dominance of the LDP in that period of time. In relation to
the political system of Japan, the so-called “Iron Triangle” or elite model were also
discussed. The interrelationship of the three angles have been regarded as a unique
feature of Japanese politics and its strong economic growth in the LDP dominance
regime, but nevertheless also became associated with “money politics” which
resulted in scandals.

In closing, this section has mainly employed a descriptive approach on the
political system of Japan in the pre-1993 period in which LDP had been dominant.
There had been a number of opposition parties but none of them could exert serious
threat to the LDP’s position for various reasons. However, this situation was to
change in 1993.

3. Japan’s political institutions in the post-1993 period

Japan’s political institution in the post 1993 period up to the year of 2004 can be
called Single Party rule to LDP-led coalition.

3.1 One Party rule to LDP-led coalition
The key difference between the pre- and post- 1993 regime is the shift from LDP
one-party rule to LDP-led coalition. From August 1993 to April 1994, eight parties
joined together to form the first non- LDP government in 38 years and promised to
“break the collusive relationship between politicians, bureaucrats, and business
(Nakano, 1998, p.291). This started the prologue of chaotic regime change from LDP
dominance regime (1955-1993) to the first non-LDP Hosokawa, Hato and Murayama
governments (1993 – 1996) and finally to LDP-led coalition regime.

In June 1993, the HR passed a no-confidence resolution against the LDP
government headed by Miyazawa Kiichi, effectively putting an end to the LDP’s
long reign which was subsequently sealed by the July general election (Shinoda,
1998, p.41). The prime minister who emerged at that time was the Hosokawa
Morihiro of the Japan New Party (JNP). He had to lead an unprecedented coalition of
eight political groups with a wide range of conflicting political agendas.
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Mulgan (2003, p.175) argues that coalitions are a product of the need for working
majorities in parliamentary Cabinet systems. Parties do not normally enter into a
coalition if they can avoid it. But the starting in June 1994, even the LDP was only
able to resume power by entering into a formal coalition agreement with two
defectors from the anti-LDP coalition – the Socialist Party (JSP / SDPJ) and
Sakigake. This new three-way coalition government lasted until the HR elections of
October 1996, when a general election was held to choose a new 500-member HR.
This was the first contest held under a sweeping electoral reform passed in 1994.
Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro's LDP made significant gains with 239 seats, but
fell short by 12 seats of a majority needed to rule on its own.

As a result, Hashimoto sought to renew the previous three party-coalition
(January 1996 to then) that he headed; however, his two coalition partners--the
Social Democratic Party (SDPJ) and a tiny splinter group called Sakigake
party--refused his overture, fearing that they would become irrelevant parties in an
LDP-dominated coalition. Instead, the three parties agreed to form a loose alliance
and cooperate outside the cabinet through frequent policy consultation. The SDPJ
and the Sakigake party were excluded from Hashimoto’s minority cabine. The
shortfall in seats saw the LDP continuing a parliamentary alliance with Socialists and
Sakigake until September 1997, by which time it had attracted a sufficient number of
HR members back into its ranks to regain a majority.

In spite of the restoration of its majority-party status, the LDP continued its
cooperative relationship with the SDPJ and Sakigake outside the Cabinet until April
1998 when the Socialists and Sakigake pulled out of the alliance in order to
underscore their identities as separate parties in the lead-up to the July 1998 HC
election.

The LDP’s propensity for forming quasi-coalitions during this period was
influenced to some extent by its weakened position in the HC. Despite the LDP’s
majority in the HR, the number of seats it held in the HC fell to such a low level that
it again pursed the coalition option, this time with the Liberal Party (LP), which was
brought into the Cabinet in January 1999 (a combination that still fell short of a
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majority of seats in the HC), followed by the “New Komeito”, which was formally
incorporated into the coalition in October that year. In April 2000, the LDP and
Komeito ended their coalition with the Liberal Party, but invited back into the
coalition a group of defectors from the Liberal Party who had formed the
Conservative Party (Hoshuto).

The results of the 2000 HR election have only served to entrench coalition
politics further. The three ruling parties presented voters with a solid coalition front,
with a clear choice between the tripartite alliance and a number of separate
opposition parties. In June 2000, the ruling coalition of the LDP, New Komeito and
New Conservative Party (NCP) won a comfortable majority. The ruling coalition,
with a total of 271 seats, enjoyed the so-called perfect working majority in the HR. It
commanded an absolute majority on all committees, in addition to monopolizing the
chairmen’s post on all those committees. Therefore, political and economic change
can only come from within the LDP for the moment.

In October, 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro dissolved the HR after he
was re-elected as the Liberal Democrat Party chief on September 20. The election
was the first since Koizumi was named Prime Minister in April 2001. The major
participants were the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP) and the Democrat Party (DPJ).
The LDP retains strong support in rural areas and among older voters due to heavy
subsidies in agriculture, while the DPJ has had greater support among youth and in
urban areas. However, this has tended to favor the LDP, because sparsely populated
rural districts have disproportionate weight in Japan's electoral system.

National newspapers concluded that the election benefited the Democrat Party
(DPJ) more so than the LDP. The DPJ gained 40 more seats, making it the largest
opposition party with a total HR membership of 177. Among those in the ruling
coalition, only the New Clean Government Party (New Komeito) made gains,
bringing its total HR membership to 34 from 31 members before the election.

The LDP failed to achieve an absolute majority by itself, with only 237 seats,
which required it to maintain its coalition with the New Clean Government Party and
the New Conservative Party. Senior politicians in the LDP attributed the results to
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disenfranchisement among traditional supporters of the LDP, resulting in an
increased dependency on the coalition. Some politicians in the LDP are concerned
about the influence of the New Clean Government Party on LDP policy because of
the dependency. This revealed that the LDP failed to capture abundant support from
non-old agriculture sector in order to maintain its majority in the Diet after 1993, so
it is risky or even impossible for the LDP to keep its status by not working with other
parties and forming coalitions in the future.

The 2003 poll was unprecedented in the degree to which coalition candidates
stuck to unified campaign pledges and the coalition parties cooperated in arranging
combined candidates in particular constituency. Furthermore, the LDP’s overall
performance in the election meant that a continuation of coalition arrangements was
necessary because of the loss of its clear majority in the HR. Please see Figure 1 for
details.

Figure 1: The Checklist of Coalition Governments in the 1990s and early 2000s
Prime Minister

Participating Parties

Lower House elections, July

JSP, Shinseito, Komeito, JNP,

1993

DSP, Sakigake, Shaminren,

Hosokawa

Minkarien (Rengo)

Hata
Murayama

The above parties, not
including JSP and Sakigake

Dates

August 1993 – April 1994

April – June 1994

LDP, JSP, Sakigake

June 1994 – July 1995

LDP, JSP, Sakigake

July 1995 – Jan 1996

Hashimoto

LDP, JSP, Sakigake

January – October 1996

Lower House elections,

LDP, (JSP and Sakigake)

October 1996

supported government but not

Hashimoto

in it

Upper House elections, July
1995
Murayama

Upper House elections, July
1998

LDP, Liberal Party (Jiyuto)

Obuchi

Obuchi
April, 2000
Mori

October 1996 – 1998

January 1999 – September
1999

Above parties + Komeito

September 1999 – April 2000

Above parties + Komeito

April, 2000 - July, 2000

37

Upper House elections, July
2000

Above parties + Komeito

July 2000 - April 2001

Mori
April 2001
Lower House elections,
Nov 2003

LDP + Komeito and New
Conservative Party (NKP)

April 2001 – Nov 2003

Koizumi
Upper House elections,
July 2004

LDP + Komeito

Nov 2003 – Sept 2005

Koizumi

3.2 Events leading to the July 1993 Election
Members of Japan’s HR are elected to four-year terms, and another election was
not due until February 1994, but in 1993 the HR was dissolved as a result of the
successful no-confidence motion against the Miyazawa government, only the second
time since the formation of the LDP that a no-confidence motion had actually carried
out (Jain, 1993, p.1073). The political reform that was being initiated the main issue
that resulted in the no-confidence vote against the government. In the beginning of
1990s, social discontent reached a peak and the Japanese strove for a “clean”
government and new political phenomenon.

The ever-increasing corruption in Japanese politics was one of the factors which
resulting in the no-confidence vote. As discussed earlier in this chapter the post-war
election system stimulated the competition between different members of the LDP
and this serious competition within the same party led to a reliance on a large pool of
money from the corporate and business. Elections were very much candidate-based
rather than party-centered and policy-based. This led to the pervasive and
much-criticised “money politics”. In the second half of the 1980s and the beginning
of the 1990s, several scandals involving LDP politicians were exposed, culminating
in 1992, the Takeshita faction was the largest in the LDP and by far the most
influential in Japanese politics. However, Takeshita’s involvement in the Recruit
scandal and Kanemaru Shin’s resignation from the Diet in November 1992, due to
his admission of receiving 500 million yen in illegal political contributions was
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followed in March 1993 by another corruption scandal which further damaged the
image and popularity of the LDP when the LDP kingmaker and former vice-president,
Kanemaru, was arrested and faced trial on charges of evading taxes on his massive
personal fortune, a large part of which he allegedly obtained through secret donations
from construction contractors (Jain, 1993, p.1077).

The economic down-turn since 1990s and the LDP government’s failure to tackle
the situation effectively led the Japanese to ask for “clean” and “capable” new
government. The burst of the economic “bubble” with the historically high
unemployment rate, all these accelerated the urge for the change. Moreover, the
campaign financing scandals, such as the Recruit Scandal, further undermined the
popularity of the LDP.

The Japan New Party (1992) was the first one to challenge the LDP as a
conservative opposition rival, in contrast to the mainly centre-left opposition
challenges for most of the postwar period, but it was the defection of a large number
of LDP MP’s into the Japan Renewal Party (1993) and the New Harbinger Party
(1993) that was the key event which ended decades of the LDP rule (Babb, 1999).
Moreover, the oldest of these was the Japan New Party which was formed in May
1992 under the leadership of Hosokawa Morihiro, formerly an HC member from the
Tanaka faction and governor (1983-91). In early 1993, Hosokawa’s popularity began
to increase and enjoyed a support rate of more than 10% (Jain, 1993, p. 1072).

The LDP maintained a majority of seats in both houses of the Diet from 1955
until 1989, when it lost its majority in the HC in 1989, getting only 36 seats, while
the JSP won 46 seats. Therefore, in 1989, the LDP lost control of the HC.

However, in 1993, the LDP also lost its majority in the HR. Not only because the
LDP lost many votes, but also because 3 more parties – the JNP, Sakigake and J.R.P
emerged and captured massive votes in the expense of the LDP in which the JNP,
Sakigake and JRP won a total of 103 seats. The LDP only won 223 seats of the 511
total, and was totally expelled from the core of power.

The early 1990s finally brought vindication to the perennial losers –opposition
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parties. In 1989, the LDP lost an election and control of the HC of the Diet. This was
followed in 1993 by defections of Ozawa faction from the LDP, by the LDP losing
control of the HR, and by the first non – LDP government since the party’s formation
in 1955.

3.3 Japan’s New Electoral System
The rules of the game for the election system changed in the 1990s. First,
traditionally that the election system was favorable for rural areas where the LDP had
been particularly strong. However, since some of the population had shifted from the
rural areas to urban areas, the Diet made some adjustments and redistributed some
rural seats to urban seats. The adjustments made in December 1992 resulted in
cutting out ten rural seats and added nine urban ones, thus reducing the total
membership of the HR from 512 to 511 (Jain, 1993, p. 1081). As discussed, the vote
from the rural areas is one of the main pillars for the LDP in elections. The
redistribution of seats among rural and urban districts changed the election
mechanism and damaged the advantageous position that the LDP had in the former
election system in the pre-1990s period. It is no longer easy for the LDP to maintain
its dominance in elections with the support of the agriculture sector.

Later on, the Japanese national legislature (Diet) passed electoral reform
measures on three separate occasions. First, in March, 1994, bills were passed which
changed the election system for the House of Representatives, altered campaign
regulations, and created public subsidies for political parties. Two of these bills
amended the existing legislation; two other bills created new laws. (Christensen,
1996, p.67).

The new Japanese electoral system is a hybrid of plurality and proportional
representation (PR) system. In total, three hundred of the five hundred seats in the
HR are allocated to each of three hundred new electoral districts, while the remaining
two hundred seats are allocated by PR system. Japan was divided up into seven
regional PR districts, and based on the population, each district elected from seven to
thirty-three representatives. Voters selected parties, and seats were allocated to the
parties based on each party’s share of the vote in that district (Christensen, 1996, p.
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51).

This kind of voting system created incentives for small parties to form coalitions
to win the only one seat in each district. As Christensen (1996, p. 52) argued, “Voters
will select one candidate in each district, and there will be only one victor in each
district. These districts create strong incentives for small parties to merge or at least
form electoral coalitions that have a chance of winning the support of half the
electorate in each of these districts”.

Also, the proportional representative (PR) system actually encouraged the
survival of the smaller size political parties since they were only need to get a part of
the votes in order to secure one seat in the election. PR districts drastically reduced
victory thresholds and gave the opportunities for small and minor parties. Thus the
single-seat districts and the PR districts produced contradictory incentives since the
single-member seats reduced the opportunities of the small parties to join but the
remaining seats in PR election method could motivate the small parties to join. Three
hundred seats are contestable only by parties large enough to attract nearly 50
percent of the voters in a district; the other two hundred seats can be won by parties
that can get the support of only 3, 5, or 10 percent of the voters in a PR region. The
rules of the game in the election system changed significantly. The situation is totally
different from was it has been in the former SNTV of plurality electoral system, for
the LDP could no longer be assured of hegemony in the new hybrid of plurality and
proportional representation (PR) election system.

Candidates have larger chances to be elected in the HR and HC respectively. As
the electoral rules allow candidates to run in the local single-seat districts and to be
list on a party PR list in the same election (dual-listed candidate must run in local,
single-seat districts that are within the bounds of the PR regional district in which
they are listed). In addition to it, such dual-listed candidates can also be given
identical numerical rankings on the PR list. If the dual-list candidate wins in his/her
local district, then her name would be removed from the party list for the PR district
since she has already been elected (Christensen, 1996, p.59). In return, it makes the
election result more unpredictable and complicated.
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The contradictory effects of the electoral system seemingly reducing and at the
same time increasing the motivations of the small political parties to get elected
(Christensen 1996, p.59), besides, the new Japanese election system also includes
legal barriers to the electoral access of small parties. For instance, a party must win 3
percent of the vote nationwide to be eligible to win any PR seats. Another barrier
exists for small parties if they want to register to be on the PR ballot in a district, they
should meet at least one of the three following conditions: (1) in the most recent
national election, the party received at least 2 percent of the nationwide vote; (2) the
party has at least five sitting members of the HR and the HC combined; or (3) the
party listed a sufficient number of candidates on its PR district list equal to at least 20
percent of the seats up for election in that district.

Besides some strict requirements, the law also requires a deposit of 600,000 yen
per candidate which only refunded depending on the number of victors that the party
has. If the party did not win any PR seats, it would lose its entire deposit
(Christensen, 1996, p.67). Therefore, this law also encouraged parties to merge in
order to get the entry qualification to the election.

The political reforms also placed additional restrictions on the fundraising
activities of individual politicians. The added burden of these new restrictions is
compensated for by (1) a new programme of national subsidies of political parties
and (2) the relatively unfettered fundraising abilities of political parties.

The reforms attempt to channel political money into routes other than the
traditional fundraising that resulted in money politics (Christensen, 1996; Stockwin,
2003; Mulgan, 2003; Hrebenar, 2000). The reform stipulated that each candidate is
now allowed only one official fundraising organization. Corporations and other
organizations can contribute only 500,000 yen in a calendar year to a politician’s
official fundraising organization and this fundraising activity would be completely
banned after five years.

Corporations and other organizations would then be allowed to give money only
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to political parties. In addition to it, only political parties are allowed to give money
directly to candidates; this provision is designed to make it difficult for factional
organizations to give campaign funds to their members (Christensen, 1996, p.63).
Reporting thresholds were also lowered for most instances of political giving. An
individual or organization’s contributions to either a party or a candidate’s official
fundraising organization must be reported if such donations exceed 100,000 yen in a
calendar year. Purchases of tickets to fundraising events must be reported if a person
or organization purchases more then 200,000 of tickets at a single event.

On the other side, individual contributions to political parties and political
organizations are encouraged. Such donations have been made tax deductible. In a
calendar year an individual may give a total of 20 million yen to political parties and
political fundraising organizations. An individual may contribute an additional 10
million yen a year as political contributions to other recipients (Christensen, 1996,
p.67).

Moreover, the fourth set of bills provided for the strengthening of the penalties on
misbehavior. The candidates, their family members, their office staff, and their
campaign managers can all separately or jointly held responsible for any election
campaign irregularities or illegal handling of political funds (Christensen, 1996; 1994;
2000; Cheol, 2001).

3.4 Effects of New Electoral Laws
Although the laws were passed in 1994, the first opportunity for voting under
these new arrangements did not come until 1996; HR elections were also held in
2000 and 2003. It was predicted initially that the changes of the electoral laws would
result in the changes of the number of political parties exist. However, at the same
time, as Christensen (1996; p.59) has observed, the rules of the game in Japan
political system changed as “the electoral reforms increase the likelihood that
coalition governments will become common. The party realignment that has
occurred will make coalition governments much more common in Japan”.
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The reason was that assuming all things being equal, the new electoral system
gave the largest party such a huge bonus of seats that the party should not need
coalition partners to govern. However, the electoral reform and party realignment
have split the LDP, and if two parties split the single-seat districts, it is likely that
neither party will pick up a sufficient number of seats in the PR races to become a
majority party. Coalition governments will therefore become more common under
the new electoral system.

Another important implication of the new electoral system in the new regime was
to end the money politics. It was found to be less effective in achieving this aim
mainly due to two main reasons. First, the flow of money from business to political
kingmakers could continue unabated since businesses would still be able to give
money to both national and local party organizations. As the dominant party leader in
that area, they will still control the local party chapters. Businesses will still be able
to contribute funds to as many local party organizations as their favorite politician in
every town, and neighbourhood of a candidate’s election district (Christensen, 1994;
1996).

Second, business contributions that are given to national party organizations can
still be allocated to influential politicians. A business donor need only specify
informally that the funds contributed are to be controlled by a specific party member.
That means the contribution of money to the party would be actually given to
someone that the business has been supporting (Christensen, 1994; 1996).

Hrebenar (2000, p.80) stated that tickets for fund-raising “parti” events still offer
politicians a loophole that allows them to hide the donors of some of their funds.
Buyers of tickets for fund-raising parties of less than 200,000 yen do not have to be
reported. The 1998 Political Funds Control Law (PFCL) report noted the significance
of “parti” money generated for individual politicians. The biggest fund-raising
“parti” of 1997 was held by the Mitsuzuka faction and produced nearly 3 billion yen
for the faction. Other prominent LDP leaders also did well at such “parti” events,
with nineteen of the top twenty two such events generating money for either LDP
factions or senior LDP politicians. The Democratic Party generated more than 2.6
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billion yen; Ozawa, leader of the Liberal Party, produced 1.6 billion yen; and the
Sakigake got a little over 1 billion yen (Asahi Shimbun, September 11, 1998).

The electoral system seems to be not so effective in solving these problems of
money politics. Also, the LDP had earlier controversially decided to allow the
donations to continue despite legislation to the contrary, but Obuchi reversed the
decision in the face of strong criticism from within the ruling coalition, especially
New Komeito, and opposition among the general public. It is obvious that the LDP
took into consideration the likely effects on the administration's political foundation
and the next HR general election. Aiming to gain back public support and popularity,
on September 11, 1999, Prime Minister Obuchi, who was the LDP president,
officially announced that the “LDP has decided to ban political donations from
business corporations and organizations to individual politicians funds-management
organizations from next year.” The announcement was delivered during Obuchi's
face-to-face debate with opposition leaders (Daily Yomiuri, September 11, 1999).

It is clear that the electoral reform was one of the means used by the Hosokawa
government to make it more difficult for the LDP to return to power again. If we
assume this was the main purpose of the electoral reform, we can count this is a
successful reform. The new election system leads to the change of the rules of the
game as well as the election mechanism in Japan. The hybrid of plurality and
proportional representation system (PR) system encouraged the formation of new
political parties and mergers. The PR system makes it easier for small parties to
survive in the election and leads the LDP tended to look to different coalitions of
interest groups support as a way to compete against their party colleagues, which
greatly damaged the advantage of the LDP in the election mechanism. The reform
creates a more competitive party system, with the potential to lead to an alternation
of parties in power. We can see the introduction of a new electoral system
precipitated the collapse of the one-party dominant regime in its initial impact, but,
as for what its impact is going to be over the long term, it seems to have generated
pressures both for party consolidation and fragmentation and make it difficult for the
LDP to gain majority on its own.
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3.5 The impact on factional politics
It was expected that the institutional changes would produce a drastic change in
factional dynamics within the LDP, since only one candidate can be endorsed and
elected in a single-member district system, so intra-party competition in the same
district would end. Candidates would be less likely to disclose their factional
affiliation to enhance their chances of receiving cross-factional support; as a
consequence, factions were not expected to receive new members. In addition to it,
faction leaders were expected to lose their ability to mobilize funds since public
monies were to be channeled directly to the party headquarters under the new law on
funding. Faction leaders thus would lose some of their authority to control how party
money was distributed (Cheol, 2001, p. 431).

The effects of political reform are more refractive in the sense that the faction
managers were working harder to mold and bend their organizations to conform to
their own preferences and organizational interests in a changed institutional
environment. Factions did not simply disappear; rather, they have preserved their
organizational form but with different attributes (Cheol, 2001, p.433).

The prediction of the decline of recruiting new member did not happen. Even
though there no longer is competition among incumbent members in the elections
themselves, fierce competition does arise to win party nomination when seats
become available in any given district. Faction leaders are desperate to place
members of their own faction in those districts. Thus, the sense of competition has
shifted from the post-endorsement stage to the pre-endorsement one (Cheol, 1998,
2001).

With respect to the new reluctance to disclose factional allegiances, Cox et al
(1999, p.44) argued that “undisclosed” does not mean “unaffiliated”. LDP candidates
have little incentive to declare their factional affiliation before they get elected
because it reduces their chances to obtain electoral support from other factions.

Besides, there is no empirical evidence to indicate that factions have given up on
recruiting new members. In fact, rather than giving up recruiting in the aftermath of
the reforms, factions have persisted in their efforts to add members. The general
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convention of the Eto-Kamei faction held on November 4, 1999, well before the
2000 general election, saw some 16 individuals step up on the stage to be introduced
as new members (Cheol, 2001, p.445).

Other factions also engaged in similar practices and newspaper analysts continue
to identify the factional affiliation of new candidates with complete certainty. That
the reforms have not blunted the efforts of factions to grow can be seen in the way in
which the Hashimoto faction went from being the LDP’s third largest faction in 1993
to once again being its largest by the decade’s end. Leaders of the faction made
aggressive recruitment efforts among junior Diet members in order to recoup the
losses the faction experienced after the departure of the Ozawa group in 1993.

The changes in the funding law influenced the potential contributors to individual
Diet members. The faction’s fund-raising role is shifting from centralized
mobilization and distribution of money to providing an umbrella for individualized
mobilization through mutual assistance. Politicians rely more on their own efforts to
raise the funds they need, which they do through attracting private contributions or
by holding fund-raising parties (Asahi Shinbun, 1999).

Cheol (2001, p.459) argued that factions now mobilize less than one-tenth of the
money that they had been able to under the old system, according to Ochiai Kazuo,
administrative secretary of the former Nakasone faction (Ochiai, 1999). Accordingly,
factions have only a nominal amount of money to distribute to their members. An
LDP member told Cheol that he received 2 million yen two times a year from his
faction but that could only cover a month’s worth of telephone and postage bills
(Takemoto, 1999).

Though numerous LDP members made it clear that they receive less money from
LDP headquarter than they do from their factions, the proportion of the money that
will be channeled to individual LDP members is relatively minimal. As far as
funding is concerned, individual politicians are responsible for generating the money
they need from all imaginable sources. The money distributed by either a faction or
the party is just a show of their loyalty to their parties (Cheol, 2001, p.461).
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3.6 Other factors contributing to the new regime - LDP coalition rule

3.6.1

Ozawa Defection

First, the Ozawa defection in 1993 shocked the entire regime and ensured that the
LDP could not get majority in the following no-confidence vote and the HR election.
The rule of the LDP ended in 1993. After a money scandal involving former LDP
vice-president Kanemaru, one LDP faction, led by former LDP secretary-general
Ozawa Ichiro, left the party and created a new one called “Shinsei-to” (the Japan
Renewal Party, or JRP).

Actually, many studies reveals that Ozawa was the key actor in 1993 because he
led the most significant defection of politicians from the LDP; an act that brought
down the government. Ironically, the movement’s leader, Ozawa, was a most
unlikely reformer – a protégé of scandal –tainted Prime Minister Tanaka and the heir
to a long line of corrupt, money-oriented LDP politicians. He put together the
non-LDP coalition government that took power after the 1993 election. Ozawa’s
defection is one of the main reasons for the ending of the LDP hegemony in 1993.

The Ozawa faction not only defected, but also formed a coalition government
with all the anti-LDP parties except the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The Ozawa
faction had been “owned” at first by former Prime Minister Tanaka and later by
former Prime Minister Takeshita. Both of them resigned because of bribery scandals.
At one time, Ozawa’s was the biggest faction in the LDP and was considered to be
able to obtain and use the most money. If one thinks of anti-LDP parties as uncorrupt
and unconcerned about having seats in the cabinet, it might seem strange that the
critics of the LDP ’s “money politics” or corruption formed a coalition government
with this faction (Otake, 1996, p.336)

Therefore, in order to avoid public criticism of money politics and the execution
failure of the LDP government, Ozawa and his coalition partners strived for the
change of election rules in 1994 in order to recast themselves as the champion of
political reform.

Mulgan (2003, p.47) also observed that there is a number of reasons for making
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the coalition became possible. The first reason was some of the LDP’s coalition or
loose alliance partners contain constituents who were formerly from the LDP camp
itself, such as the Liberal, Conservative and Sakigake parties. And this is a reflection
of restructuring in the party system which reached a peak in 1993 to 1998. Many of
Japan’s new opposition parties were formally under the LDP. This not only damaged
the factionalism and harmony among the factions of the LDP, but also formed a
strong anti-LDP force. In order to tackle these powerful anti-LDP forces, the LDP
had no means but to build close cohesion and formed coalition with other parties.

Second, the opposition parties that formerly did not have enough experience and
leadership talents became more experienced in this stage, for all the main opposition
parties or their predecessor organizations, except for the Japan Communist Party
(JCP), have gained government and leadership experience in coalitions and therefore
they are better potential partners in LDP-led coalition.

Third, since the loss of its dominant power, the LDP was anxious to regain power,
so the LDP then put aside its long-standing confrontation with the SDPJ on matters
such as Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the status of the Japanese
Self-Defense Forces and the US-Japan Security Treaty. Curtis (1999, p.189)
mentioned that “the LDP and JSP had been traditional archenemies, but now that
alliance with the Socialists was the only way the LDP could return to power, LDP
leaders, who for years had accused the Socialist Party of undermining political
stability and compromising the national interest”.

In the pre-1990s period, it was not so much characterized by conflict between the
LDP and the JSP. The formation of coalition between them was only a kind of
division of labour. The LDP managed the alliance with the United States, the
Socialists keep open lines of communication to the Soviet Union and China. They
somehow showed conflict in publicly-visible Diet sessions, but they actually
cooperated behind the scenes and developed close personal relations. This policy
flexibility provided a favourable environment for the coalition of the two
oppositional parties.

Fourth, the differences on policy issues amongst the majority of Japan’s political
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parties have become less clear in the 1990s than in the previous decades. The
situation was that the diminished differences between the LDP and the largest single
opposition party since 1993 – the Democratic Party (DPJ) – on various policies
including security and defence, compared with the much sharper policy differences
that existed between the LDP and the opposition Socialist Party and JCP during the
years of LDP one-party rule regime.

Fifth, the credit that LDP claimed from the economic prosperity in the pre-1980s
had been totally eroded due to the long economic recession since 1990. Moreover,
the new election law together with the bursting economic bubble forced the business
sector to change their relations with the political parties. The Keidanren moved away
from using donations to secure its interest to publicising its favored policies and
participating in government economic panels, which weakened the funding raising
ability and the cohesion with business sector dramatically in the LDP-lead coalition
regime.

To conclude, the political institutions of Japan, as far as the electoral system, the
inter-party relationships and the intra-LDP dynamics, were found to be changed
substantially in the pre and post-1993 period. In the pre-1993 period, the
conservative LDP held a lion’s share of the seats in both the HR and the HC for
nearly 40 years. The reason for the dominance of the LDP was the support of the
business sector since the LDP dominance provided a favourable environment for the
growth of business. The close relationship between the agriculture sectors due to the
protectionist industrial policy also played a extent role in maintaining the stability of
the LDP.

However, the rules of the game and the mechanisms in the political

system changed substantially in the 1990s.

The formation of the coalition party system since 1993 has not been a static
situation, but rather the formation of the governments has been changing under the
leadership of the LDP (except for the period from August 1993-June 1994).
Therefore starting from post-1993, or at least post-1994 the regime of Japan was
changed from LDP dominance to LDP-led coalition. It was mainly due to the
changes of Japan in the early 1990s in which Japan underwent a change in the rules
of the game, in which the change in public policies, and the changes of the electoral
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system created a major change for the political development of Japan. Since some
politicians are for single-member election but some are for proportional
representative system (PR), this created changes in the factional politics of the LDP,
but, nevertheless, the intra-party and inter-party competition still exists in Japan. The
changes in campaign finance reform did not end the money politics in Japan but
rather different factions in LDP and other parties changed their attributes and
behaviour in response to them. It was somehow difficult for the LDP to earn a
predominant share of the votes right now since the rules of the game in the LDP-led
coalition regime are no more as stable and predictable as they were in the LDP
dominance regime.
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Chapter Three

Socio-economic coalition: Pre-1990s and Post-1990s periods

As argued by Pempel (1998, p.21), there can be considered to be three major
pillars in a regime, which are interlocking with each other. Detailed explanations on
the changes on political institutions were discussed in the previous chapter while the
public policies paradigm in the pre-1990s and post-1990s will also be discussed in
the next chapter. The changes in the socio-economic coalition in Japan in those
particular periods of time were also obvious in Japan. The changes co-existed with
the correlation of the changes in political institution and the public policies paradigm.
It has been argued that the socio-economic coalition is the base and foundation for
any regime anywhere, but especially in Japan in which a strong connection existed
between business sectors and bureaucracy and political parties, as well as the
agricultural sector. In this chapter, the changes in socio-economic coalition in the
pre-1990s and post-1990s periods are explained. Analysis will be put on the
interactions between the changes in socio-economic coalition with the political
institutions and public policy paradigm in Japan.

The chapter will start with the

general description of the social-economic foundation of Japan in the pre-1990s and
post-1990s period and the analysis in relation with the political regime and the public
policy will also be discussed.

1. Pre-1990s socio-economic regime in Japan

It was crucial to understand that the socio-economic base is reflected in the
character of any regime. It was perhaps important to understand the socio-economic
coalition of Japan in the pre-1990s period before drawing the comparison with the
more recent period.

Many scholars have drawn attention to the so-called “iron triangle” to explain
the close and interdependent relationships between the LDP, business sector and the
bureaucracy (Maclachlan, 2004, p.68). The LDP had been in power for such a long
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time that important policy decisions have inevitably revolved around the
conservative party and its internal political processes. The bureaucrats as well as
various interest groups, large and small, played important parts in the
decision-making system. The bureaucrats are responsible for drafting and proposing
the bill to the Diet and taking control of the execution. Whereas, the business sector
devotes their “support” to bureaucrats and political parties in order to strive for
favourable policy and business environment. Legislators in the National Diet have
the authority to vote for “pass” or “veto” the bill. The real situation was the interplay
of relative power between each actor in the Japanese policymaking process
(Hrebenar, 2000, p.245). Yanaga (1968, p.95) also stated that organized business, the
party government, and the administrative bureaucracy are the “three legs” of the
“tripod” on which the Japanese political system rests. Functionally, they are
interdependent, even though they operate for the most part in distinct areas.

Burks (1991, p.164) also stated that the top LDP chieftains, high-level
bureaucrats, and powerful business leaders built a close-knit network that gave it a
very favourable environment for success and exerts great influence among the
society. Elitist theory sees these three groups as holding compatible interests and
values and as acting together to produce policies that benefit all three and thus
entrench their power position, and policymaking to be a result of the interactions
among the various factions of the LDP, the various groups of bureaucrats, and
diversified business interests (Hrebenar, 2000, p.251).

The socio-economic base of the rule of Japan was on an alliance among big
and small business as well as organized agriculture. In Japan, no business-labour
alliance emerged; rather, business and agriculture forged an anti-labour ‘alliance’that
relied, not on an open domestic market, but on mercantilist policies. The
relationships between business (including large and small) and organized agriculture
was so close that they would like to influence and maintain the status quos of the
public policies of Japan by preventing changes from mercantilism to an open market
economy. We can find that business sectors exerted great influence to the
bureaucracy and political parties in the one-party dominant regime in the pre-1990s.
Yet, Sugimoto (1997, p.23) also stated the importance of the bureaucracy in the “Iron
Triangle” in Japan. Bureaucracy holds supreme authority over business sectors in
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Japan because government ministries control licensing, permitting and the
implementation of publicly-funded projects which gives such a wide range of power
over the business activities. Moreover, bureaucrats are responsible for preparing the
bills for social goods and favorable business environment. Bills prepared by
bureaucrats for the National Diet also need to be deliberated by the legislators,
especially those of the government parties.

In the aspect, it was believed that mercantilism is one of the outcomes of the
“iron triangle” which was aided by the alliance and also served to keep the members
of that alliance close with each other. The policy was also due to the conservative and
dominant power of the LDP in which it would like to strive for the economic
prosperity in the post-war period and also help to enlist the support of the business
sector and the agricultural sector. Therefore, we can see mercantilism is an ideology
in Japan which helps to keep harmony of the socio-economic coalition and formed
the so called “Iron Triangle” model in Japan.

The benefits of mercantilism to the alliance’s participants were obvious. For
example, by the end of 1960 Japan’s net fixed capital stock was 14,353 yen billion
but by the end of 1971 it had grown 327 percent to 46,880 billion yen (Dekle, 1989,
p.353). Moreover, because government restrictions limited competition from
technologically and managerially sophisticated and capital-rich overseas firms,
Japanese products dominated the expanding domestic market, securing for Japanese
manufacturers a solid home base from which to expand their markets internationally.
This sort of restriction prevented the intensive competition of local business from the
international market and in return gain the support of the business sector in the
pre-1990s period.

In a similar situation, the export-driven economic success, the protective
fortress (mercantilism) for agriculture and small businesses, and the continued stream
of direct subsidies, tax incentives and other favorable policies continued the
collaboration of these key sectors. Small-business owners also benefited from direct
assistance programmes as well as from a politically-driven laxity in the enforcement
of labour, environmental, and tax laws. As Calder argued there were many policies
that benefited the interests of the small businesses, including credit policies, loans
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provision, preferential trade policies and tax policies. As late as the early 1970s,
agricultural expenditures as a proportion of total government spending were typically
four times greater in Japan than in France, Britain, the United States, or West
Germany (Calder, 1988, p.253). In regard to the income of farmers in agricultural
sector, farm families remained as high as those in urban and manufacturing areas
while regional income disparities were also kept low. Farm subsidies were so
extensive that it was argued that “rice farmers and agricultural cooperatives had
become political wards of the state”. (Donnelly, 1977, p.53). The continued high
growth was essential to maintaining such costly economic inefficiency. The high
growth rate in economy in the 1960s and 1970s enabled the government to provide
subsidies to the farming sector and preferential policies to the business sectors, to get
their support to the dominance of the LDP.

It was shown that the strong cohesion of the business sectors and the
agricultural sectors were mainly due to the interests in maintaining the mercantilist
industrial and economic policies, which in result helps to strengthen the stability and
legitimacy of the LDP dominance regime for 38 years. The interested sectors were
afraid that their interests would be harmed by not supporting the government as well
as the largest and most dominant political party (i.e. the LDP).

The changes in

political institutions would definitely result in the changes in the public policies
paradigm, so all these conservative forces - business and agricultural sectors did not
want the changes to take place to the LDP one-party dominance regime.

1.1 What are the characteristics of the business sector in Japan in pre-1990s period?
There were several important business structures in Japan in the pre-1990s
period and all of them were interrelated to the dominance of the LDP and the public
polices. In the pre-1990s period, most of the individual companies in Japan were
large firms that dominated the business. In the pre-1990s, the largest businesses,
which employed more than a thousand workers each, together accounted for about
one-quarter of the nation’s productivity.

Besides the monopoly of the large business in Japan, there were some unique
characteristics of the Japanese firms on employment workforce, including lifelong
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employment on some core workforce who were graduates of high-ranking
universities in Japan, for instance Tokyo University. They signed a lifelong contract
with the firm to work until they were retired or the company was closed. They rarely
faced layoffs and they might be only forced to get early retirement in case of
financial difficulties of the company. In that sense, all the core workers were treated
as company assets and core workers were place in an important position in the
company. This sort of phenomenon was happened in almost every large business in
Japan and was a unique characteristic of large business.

Furthermore, in large companies, company practices aimed to retain the core
workforce by getting their support, such as through including them into the
discussion of new management practices and technologies that the companies would
like to launch in the future, intrafirm training programmes, supervisory selection
based on technical knowledge and leadership as well as joint consultation between
labour and management at the plant level. The joint consultation between workers
and the big business also helped enhancing the relationships and preventing core
workers from using radical and politicized national union federations. It has often
been observed that only if such consultations did not successfully resolve issues did
the labour union push for collective bargaining. These would help increasing the
overlap and interests between the managers and the core workforce of the company.

The working practices in Japan were based on the mutual respect and benefit
approach and those large companies regarded the core workforce as the assets of
their companies rather than short-term and contractual workers.

The view of

considering them as a long-term investment would certainly demand a stable public
policy from the government and thereby big business could invest for their future
through predictable policies especially under the LDP dominance. This was easier
when politics were almost guaranteed to be under conservative control and rule and
so as the public policies formed by the conservative LDP.

Bieda (1970, p.47) stated that one of the key components of the business
structure in Japan in the pre-1990s period was the trading company. It has
multifarious purposes and activities. Japan has around six thousand trading
companies, but only about forty was engaged in world trading activities. The most
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prominent include Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsui Bussan, C. Itoh, Marubeni, and Nissho
organizations. The largest two trading companies, the Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha, and
Mitsui and Company had more than 100 branches each all over the world. Their
annual sales in 1969 were at the rate of US$6 billion, which would give each of them
the rank of one of the twenty trading countries in the world.

In the pre-1990s, the top ten companies handled between 50 to 60 percent of
all of Japan’s trade, as well as 20 percent of domestic wholesales business. The total
value of their operations was typically twice the national budget and 30 percent of
GNP. In 1969, they accounted for about 50 percent of Japan’s export and about 60
percent of her imports (Bieda, 1970, p.58).

It was no doubt that the trading companies would like to get preferential
treatment from the government, especially in the areas of promoting exports and
restricting the imports of products from other nations. As mentioned, only forty of
them were engaged in world activities and thereby most of them were doing business
in the domestic market. The mercantilism industrial and economic policies would
assist them in protecting the domestic market in Japan. Furthermore, since most of
the trading companies are large business in Japan, they would also like to see
predictable policies carried out by the LDP and its policies in protecting their internal
market and facilitating them in the external markets as well.

The close relationship of the business sector also appeared in the form of
keiretsu. Keiretsu usually refers to a uniquely Japanese form of corporate
organization. A keiretsu is a grouping or family of affiliated companies that form a
tight-knit alliance to work toward each other's mutual success. The keiretsu system is
also based on an intimate partnership between government and businesses. It can best
be understood as the intricate web of relationships that links banks, manufacturers,
suppliers, and distributors with the Japanese government (Pempel, 1998, p.327).

Keiretsu operate globally and are integrated both vertically and horizontally.
They are organized around their own trading companies and banks. Each major
keiretsu is capable of controlling nearly every step of the economic chain in a variety
of industrial, resource and service sectors.
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There are horizontal and vertical keiretsu. Horizontal keiretsu included
twenty to forty or more firms of relatively similarly size that operate in different
functional areas or markets. They are usually headed by major Japanese banks and
include the “Big Six” -- Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyo, Sanwa, and Dai-Ichi
Kangyo Bank Groups. Vertical keiretsu are industrial groups connecting
manufacturers and part suppliers or manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. They
represent only 0.1 percent of Japan’ total companies, but contributed to around
roughly one-quarter of the national GNP during the postwar period (Pempel, 1998,
p.358).
Vertical keiretsu involve connections from the large firms at the top of a
pyramid down through as many as five layers of ever smaller and more specialized
subcontractors, distributors, and capital-dependent firms. For instance, the vertical
keiretsu include car and electronics producers (Toyota, Nissan, Honda -- Matsushita,
Hitachi, Toshiba, Sony) and their “captive” subcontractors. Distribution keiretsu, a
subgroup of vertical keiretsu, control much of Japanese retailing, determining what
products will appear in stores and showrooms and at what price (Clark, 1971;
Hadley,1970; Gerlach, 1992)
In the vertical keiretsu, power was concentrated at the top of the hierarchy.
Contractors typically divided orders among several subcontractors to gain multiple
alternative sources for needed parts while keeping relatively small inventories and
thus holding down fixed costs. The vertical keiretsu as well often provided vital
connections for small firms since small firms are vertically connected with the larger
high valued-added firms. In Japan, usually larger firms at the top will deliver
techniques and managerial skills to the subcontractors. These sorts of managerial
skills delivery can assist smaller firms to updated their skills, practices and
technologies, help them to increase their productivity and even providing them needs
when they have any operational problems. These sorts of assistance could definitely
reduce the conflicts and competition between large firms and small firms and can
even connect them with each other in striving for the economic interests. The results
of keiretsu will create interdependent relationships between large and small firms and
increase their internal bonds.
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The interdependent relationships of the keiretsu could reduce the conflicts
and competition between the large and small businesses. The internal cohesion of the
business sector can facilitate making a consistent position towards the government
and reflecting their views and interests in a stronger manner. As mentioned
beforehand, the public policies of the LDP were to encourage exports and restrict
imports. These sorts of policies were designed for the interest of the business sector.
The existence of keiretsu would also reinforce the support of the mercantilism and
the support of the LDP in controlling the power.
Last but not least, individual industries that do not join the keiretsu in Japan
also pursed the same common goals through trade associations. They formed into
different trade associations in order to state out the voices and for their interests.
Although there were four main trade associations, the most important was the
Keidanren (the Federation of Employers Organisations). These sorts of trade
associations had a relatively close relationship with the government and the LDP.
Two Japanese government agencies have played primary roles in regulating and
making use of trade associations: the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) and the
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
Lynn and Mckeown (1988, p.56) argued that “these associations gather a
wide range of data and provide technical information and market development
strategies for their members. At various times they have served as enforcer of carter
agreements, spokesman for the collective interests of individual sectors to both
media and the government, consolidators of members opinions on matters of
government policy, and conduits between government officials and firm members”.
These associations had relatively close links with the bureaucrats.

1.2 The relationship between organized business and the LDP

Regarding organized business, Trevor (2001p.251) stated that business
represented the national interest and, as such survival, raising living standards and
expanding economic growth remained a national priority. In fact, organized business
initiated and proposed policies. It sponsored and supported the party in power. The
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business supported the different factions of the LDP with money to support their
campaign and promotion activities.

Yukio Ozaki claimed that “the leader of a party in our country must have five
qualifications: one to four are money, and the fifth one is political ability” (Hrebenar,
2000, p.58). Money is still the most crucial ingredient in political success. A great
portion of the political activities of the major leaders of the various parties and
factions is devoted to the raising of political funds. The primary source of LDP funds
during the 1950s to 1990s was “corporate Japan”.

During the late 1970s, Japanese business gave an officially reported total of about
9 billion yen per year to the LDP. In addition, an estimated three to four times that
total was transferred from the business community to factional leaders and politicians
during a given year. The LDP established a special organization, Kokumin Seiji
Kyokai, to facilitate the collection of corporate money for the LDP (Hrebenar, 2000,
p.179).

They gave money to political parties and also had a say in political decisions,
wielding considerable influence. The group had made the government to give up
plans to raise interest rates when it had political connotations; e.g. in 1956 four major
economic organizations, the Keidanren3, Nikkeiren, the Japanese Association of
Corporate Executives and the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry forced
the Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama to resign. Also, in the 1970s, Nihachiro
Hanamura (Vice Chairman of Keidanren) relentlessly pressurised the LDP, yelling at
them and forcing them to drop demands to raise corporate taxes.4

The most important functions of the bureaucracy involve the protection and
promotion of industry, in whose behalf it formulated long-term economic plans,
made forecasts, set goals, and established priorities. Organized business provided
members for the cabinet, the Diet, and government advisory councils and
administrative commissions. It hired retired government officials as corporate

3

4

The Keidanren: Most powerful business organization, which has been described as the business
community’s “general headquarters”
Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), May 30, 2002
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executives and trade association officials. In return for political contributions by
organized business, the party in power (LDP) strove to create a political climate
conducive to carrying on profitable business enterprises.

Generally speaking, it can be argued that Japanese business groups before the
1990s were generally well-organized and these served as a solid socio-economic
coalition for supporting the dominance of the LDP and its public policy especially in
the economic and industrial part. Moreover, the keiretsu in both horizontal and
vertical parts were highly integrated and structured. These structures could facilitate
the close relationship of the business sectors and unified their roles in supporting the
roles of LDP and its public policies.

1.3 What are the characteristics of the agricultural sector in Japan in pre-1990s
period?

Mulgan (2003, p.268) argued that of all the economic sectors in Japan,
agriculture has been regarded as the one where policymaking involves the closest
adhesion among the LDP, interest groups, and ministers levels of politicization and
the closeness of ties among the LDP, interest groups, and bureaucratic agencies. The
three-way coalition of bureaucratic, party and producer organizations has formed an
“iron triangle” of vested interests in agricultural support and protection (Maclachlan,
2004).

In Japan, it was always argued that the agriculture sector was even more
internally cohesive than the business sector. One of the most important reasons for
that was the Nokyo, a system of agricultural cooperatives, which is one of the most
politically powerful organisations in Japanese politics. It is an economic entity that
provides almost every kind of service to rural areas (Yoshihisa, 2001, p.17).

The system of agricultural cooperative plays a pivotal role in the structure and
economy of Japan’s agricultural sector. Although there is no legal requirement to join
Nokyo, almost all Japanese farmers belong to the organization. It has strong ties with
the LDP. For its support of the LDP at election time, Nokyo has been able to ensure
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that farmers’ interests are protected.

Nokyo has national, prefectural, and some the thousand local organizations whose
members include 99 percent of the farm families in the country.

At the village level,

cooperatives provide purchasing, marketing, and credit facilities, crop spraying, and
equipment. They also provided sound financial support including running banks,
insurance companies, and small credit bureaus, as well as driving schools and
mail-order bride services. Nokyo on the other hand has a close cooperation with
trading companies, is Japan’s seventh-largest bank and the world’s largest insurance
company (Pempel, 1998, p.154).

The strong cohesion of the agricultural sector puts pressure on the government to
continue the mercantilism policy during the election time and the support of the
agricultural sector did ensure the victories of the LDP. The close linkage between the
agricultural sector and the LDP are mainly due to their interests. On one hand, the
products of the agricultural sector are vulnerable to foreign competition and therefore
the Nokyo is strongly against the agricultural liberalization of imports, while, on the
other side, the LDP would like the votes of the agricultural sector so that they can
secure their support in the elections. Therefore the relationship between the LDP and
the agricultural sector is interdependent and based on mutual benefits.

The pre-1990s socio-economic coalition was mainly formed by the business
sector (big and small business), bureaucracy and political parties as well as the
agricultural sector. Firms joined various trade associations to achieve the best interest
for the bureaucrats. The close connection of the business sector can form stronger
ways to express their ideas towards the government, especially for keeping the
mercantilist industrial and economic policy to facilitate their exports and restrict the
imports for competition. Furthermore, due to the close relationship between the
bureaucrats, LDP and the business sectors through the unique structure of the “iron
triangle”, the organized business had great influence over the LDP through donations,
especially in times of election.

Regarding the agricultural sector, most of the agricultural sector joined the Nokyo
and since the LDP would need the agricultural sector to support’s at elections
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therefore the interests of the agricultural sector should be protected from trade
liberalization.

Growing evidence suggested that the links between the LDP, certain interest
groups, and the national bureaucracy had become so institutionalized as a
consequence of the long-term rule by the LDP as to be a parallel threat. Others
considered the likelihood that the ever-dwindling electoral support for the LDP might
lead to a coalition government or to rule by the opposition parties.

2. Changes in the socio-economic regime in the 1990s

In the 1990s, the socio-economic structure associated with the “iron triangle” and
the business/ agriculture linkages to the LDP came under stress. The Editor of the
Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), Shimomiya Takashi has stated that the rules of the game in
the “Iron Triangle” model in Japan did change in the 1990s.5 The following section
analyses the changes which have occurred in the socio-economic regime.

2.1 The changes in agricultural and business sectors in post-1990 Japan
The strong cohesion of business and agricultural regime has changed in the
post-1990 period. Basically, two major changes have happened in the 1990s which
contributed to the overall regime changes. First, the agricultural sector and small
businesses have provided substantially less support for the LDP. Second, big business
had become more internally fragmented and not allied solidly towards support for the
LDP. The following analysis will discuss the interrelationships between the changes
in political regime and public policy paradigm.

Agricultural and small businesses occupied different positions in the 1960s and
the 1990s. Farmers and the small business had enjoyed extensive protection through
measures as farm subsidies, import quotas on key agricultural goods, and low or no
5

Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), May 30, 2002
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interest loans to small shopkeepers in the pre-1990 period. However, the number,
size and economic influence of farmers and small businesses themselves continued to
be disproportionately reduced and they were no longer as essential a factor in
deciding the winning of seats of the LDP. Urbanization and migration from rural
areas, especially by young people, played a role. In the 1965 election farmers made
up of 29 percent of the total vote but this was reduced to under 10 percent by the
2000 election (Mulgan, 2003, p.98).

Furthermore, farmers’ share in the nations’

total economic activity was also reduced due to the industrialization and economic
development of Japan, which saw the economic structure place greater emphasis on
the service sector.

The trade liberalization polices of the government, which also further damaged
the cohesion of the socio-economic coalition. In the 1990s, international pressures to
liberalize Japan’s protectionist markets, which had begun in the 1970s, reached a
peak. The LDP government and later on the post-1993 coalition governments were
also quite responsive to these pressures from the United States, the European
Community and the The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) / World
Trade Organization (WTO). Industry, banking, distribution, and insurance sectors
were opened one by one. Japan also came to have a lower average tariff rate than the
United States and the European Community. Especially in the agricultural sector,
Japan had the most liberalized market among the major industrial countries: about 70
percent of Japan’s food supply was imported. Decontrolling the rice trade seemed a
natural step in Japan’s overall process of liberalization (Kuo et al, 1992).

The trade liberalization of the LDP governments had speeded up in the late 1980s
and the farmers’ reduced support for the LDP could be shown in the loss of the HC
election in July 1989, with farm support for the party falling from 56 percent in the
1986 election to 41 percent in 1989. This was a response to the 1988 Citrus and Beef
Understanding between Japan and the United States in which Japan had made a deal
with the United States on trade liberalization. Similarly, by-elections for the HC in
1992 also showed less support for the LDP from the agricultural sector (Berger, 1981;
Kuo et al, 1992).

Apart from the trade liberalization that created adverse impacts on their interests,
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their reduction in size and economic influence also made them vulnerable and less
influential in providing secure support for the LDP.

Besides the agricultural sector, the changes in economic and industrial policy of
Japan also resulted in changes of the structure of the business sector through the
system of keiretsu. As mentioned, keiretsu was a unique system which linked up the
big business and small business together. This structure could also facilitate their
common interests and reduce the internal competition through both the vertical and
horizontal combination.

The open door policy of Japan and changes in the industrial and economy
policies resulted in joint ventures between Japanese firms and overseas firms.
Japanese companies formed strategic alliances with foreign-owned firms (Porter,
1991; Burton & Saelens, 1994).

Amongst the Japanese firms that forged

partnerships with foreign firms were Toyota and Nissan in auto manufacture; Fujitsu,
NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba in electronics; Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT)
and International Telegram and Telephone (KDD) in telecommunications (Pempel,
1997, p.241). All the changes in the 1990s resulted in a confusion of the “nationality”
of the businesses.

The alliances with foreign-owned firms reduce the extent of Japanese ownership
of the companies and in that sense, they will not be so united together through the
system of keiretsu since their interests seemed to be more diversified and they will
then compete with each other under the same structure. The changes of the keiretsu
reduced the leverage of the Japanese business sector and then their views were less
cohesive and not strong enough to reflect their views to the government. Most
importantly, they were less united to support the government to maintain the
mercantilist policies to restrict the competition (since foreign-owned firms were
formed in Japan). With less common interests for their sector, their support towards
the government as well as its policies decreased.

2.2 The division of big business in the 1990s
Same as small business, big business had cohesively supported mercantilism in
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the pre-1990s. However by the 1990s no such support existed amongst the business
sector. Numerous Japanese firms stood out as highly competitive by international
standards, particularly large manufacturers in areas such as electronics, machine tools,
and automobiles.

The mercantilism adopted by the LDP in the pre-1990s regime had maintained
the economy of Japan as being relatively closed to the outside world. The advantages
of the relatively closed economy were that Japanese firms could prevent themselves
competing directly with the outside world. However, some of the Japanese firms
were not able to compete with the outside world after the trade liberalization policy
adopted. By the 1990 period, it was interesting that two very different types of large
businesses existed in Japan. The first type was predominantly high-tech,
internationally competitive, highly-profitable and relying on little or no direct
government assistance. They were the part that was successfully established by the
LDP government through the protection of infant industries in the post-war policies.

The second type, however, were some non-competitive industries that have been
depending on the relative insulation of the Japanese market from outside investment
and imports, and a series of specific side-payments in the form of farm subsidies,
import quotas on key agricultural goods, low – or no-interest loans. The high growth
rate in Japan in the 1960s to 1980s enabled the government to provide such a large
amount of subsidies to maintain the preferential treatments for the business sector.
However, the economic recession of Japan in the early 1990s reduced the income of
the government through taxation and other means.

The division of the large business into two types resulted in sharp internal
cleavages within the Japanese business community. Pempel (1998, p.311) argued that
the socio-economic divisions of the early 1990s culminated in the actual split within
the party in 1993. The LDP split reflected to some extent the urban-rural and
competitive-uncompetitive division within the business sectors and the agricultural
sector. The competition between rural and urban sector became obvious when the
international pressure and trade liberalization forced the opening of the agricultural
and economic and industrial markets.

In terms of the business sectors, the increases

in joint ventures of created internal changes in the market which forced the business
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market to change.

Not only was big business becoming more diversified, but the political
party-business relationship was being affected by another change in the rules of the
game. From the beginning of the 1990s, as discussed in the previous chapter, public
criticism of “money politics” grew and then the LDP collapsed. The Keidanren
reviewed its political donations, policies and, in September 1993, stopped collecting
them from member companies. The donations dropped from a peak of 10 billion yen
to 3 billion yen. The Keidanren moved away from using donations to secure its
interests to publicising its favored policies and participating in government economic
panels.

The cohesion of the LDP and business sector has been further loosened in the
new coalition government regime, because under the multi-party coalitions after1993,
business found itself dealing with several political parties, not just the LDP as before
1993. The reform of election law also placed additional restrictions on the
fundraising activities of individual politicians which also greatly damaged the power
of the LDP. The reforms attempt to channel political money into routes other than the
traditional fundraising that resulting in the issue of “money politics” (Christensen,
1996; Stockwin, 2003; Mulgan, 2003; Hrebenar, 2000) by restricting the amount of
donation is restricted. The reform stipulated that each candidate is now allowed only
one official fundraising organization. Corporations and other organizations can
contribute only 500,000 yen in a calendar year to a politician’s official fundraising
organization and this fundraising activity would be completely banned in the future.

As a further step, in the House of Councillors elections in 1998, Keidanren
succeeded in securing political power within the ruling coalition not by donating
money to lawmakers, but by sending a lawmaker to the Diet to represent its interests
e.g. during the taxation reform of 1999, the Keidanren succeeded in reducing the
effective corporate tax rate.

This did bring an impact on the fundraising rule of the

old regime (i.e. LDP one-party dominance regime) in the new coalition government
regime. Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, who is the president of the Liberal
Democratic Party, even officially announced in 1999 that the “LDP has decided to
ban political donations from business corporations and organizations to individual
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politicians funds-management organizations next year.”

2.3. The bureaucrats weakened
As discussed above, the bureaucrats as well as various interest groups, large and
small, played important parts in the decision-making system. However, the
bureaucracy lost its influence and public respect during the 1990s to a certain extent.
The public's attitude toward the elite is ambivalent. The elite enjoys tremendous
social prestige, but its members are also resented. More and more criticisms grew
over the practice of amakudari, as it is popularly known; bureaucrats retiring in their
fifties often assume top positions in public corporations and private enterprise. They
also become politicians; by the late 1980s, most postwar prime ministers had had
civil service backgrounds. But, amakudari also incurred corruption scandals among
the top officials and business sector, such as the Recruit affair. Together with the
economic problems from the early 1990s, however, evidence of administrative
failures from the previous decade had, to some extent, tarnished their image.

In the 1990s, it became apparent that there were limits to the bureaucrats' power.
As cohesion between the main anchors in the “iron triangle” were loosened, together
with the emergence of the coalition government, the political regime became more
fluid. As the politicians tried to use the intense rivalry amongst the parties in the
coalition governments to their own advantage, the bureaucracy, which had become
comfortable pre-1993 in dealing with only the LDP, now that suddenly they had to
liaise with and assist several parties in the coalition governments that made them
more difficult to deal with. At the same time, the changes in the business sector,
discussed above, also made it more difficult for the bureaucrats to satisfy and control
the demands of the various business groups and sectors. For the bureaucrats, just as
much as for the politicians and businessmen, the rules of the game in the “iron
triangle” in the 1990s were no longer so simple and comprehensive.

To conclude, this chapter focused on the changes of the socio-economic regime
of Japan between the pre-1990 and the post-1990s. The socio-economic regime of
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the Japan in the pre-1990s period featured a close connection between the agriculture
and business sector (including big and small business), bureaucrats and the LDP
through the keiretsu and the ‘iron triangle” system. The close connection of the big
business and small business and the agricultural sectors provided a strong support for
the mercantilism policies that were adopted by the LDP-led government. It could be
said the pre-1990 period of Japan was a rather closed economy with protectionist
policies for the business sector (i.e. offering preferential conditions to the trading
companies in Japan) and the agricultural sectors.

The international environment and policy direction changed towards to trade
liberalization in the 1990s. The connection between the agricultural sector and the
LDP was greatly reduced due to the trade liberalization, which limited the
preferential conditions offered to the agricultural sector, and the downgrading of the
rural communities due to rapid urban development. Moreover, through the linkages
of Japanese firms with foreign-owned firms, the keiretsu system was greatly
diminished and big business itself has been divided into two communities. The close
network of the keiretsu was reduced in Japan and many of the large firms formed
networks with the firms owned by the foreigners. The mechanism in the
socio-economic coalition changed. The rules of the game in the regime changed and
more intervention by international forces occurred.

Internally, the public has striven for a “clean” government and new political
phenomenon. The new coalition government’s new election law, launched in 1994
further loosened the cohesion of the business and agricultural sectors with the LDP.
The unlimited “support” from the business section for the LDP in the pre-1990s has
been guided and restricted by the new election law.

For three decades overall real economic growth had been spectacular: a 10%
average in the 1960, a 5% average in the 1970s, and a 4% average in the 1980s.
Growth slowed markedly in the 1990s largely because of the after-effects of
overinvestment during the late 1980s and contractionary domestic policies intended
to wring speculative excesses from the stock and real estate markets. After the
“bubble” burst, the Japanese economy averaged around 1% in the 1990s.
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Government efforts to revive economic growth have met with little success and
were further hampered first by the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis and then in
2000-2001 by the slowing of the US and Asian economies.

The government of

Koizumi Junichiro has enacted or attempted to pass (sometimes with failure) major
privatization and foreign-investment laws intended to help stimulate Japan's dormant
economy.

While some of these laws have been enacted, the economy has yet to

respond, and Japan's aging population is expected to place further strain on the
socio-economic coalition in the near future.

70

Chapter Four

Public Policy Paradigm in Japan: Comparison between the pre -1990s and the
1990s periods

The theoretical framework suggested by Pempel (1997, 1998) argued that in
order to assess the regime changes of a nation, the changes in public policy of a
particular nation should be identified and so the public policy paradigm is one of the
pillars for assessing whether a nation has regime change or not. The changes in the
public policy paradigm in Japan could also be linked to the changes of the political
institutions, since the changes from the LDP dominance to the LDP-led coalitions
would be expected to cause changes in public policy. The new LDP-led coalition
regime, which began with the splits in the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the
destruction of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the subsequent establishment of a
number of new political parties and the change of the rules of the game in the
political system, replaced the LDP one-party dominant regime (1955-1993). But did
the formation of the coalition governments after1993 lead to the formation of
different public policy? In order to explore the changes in regime in Japan, it is
essential to look into the possible changes in public policy of Japan between the
pre-1990s and the 1990s.

Since “public policy” covers a wide range of policies, for reasons of space it is
not possible to analyse all of them and so three key policy areas are taken as
representative for the purposes of this analysis. The three policy area chosen can help
to indicate not just the content but also the direction of public policies in the two
periods, which the industrial and economic policies, the socio-welfare policies and
the foreign policies will be discussed.

1. Public Policies in the pre-1990s period

1.1 Industrial and economic policies in the pre-1990s period
The postwar fast economic growth of Japan was mainly guided by the managed
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economic policy of the Japanese government and the close cohesion of the anchors in
the “Iron Triangle”; it was not totally dependent on the resilience of the market
economy. At that period of time, LDP was the ruling party and most of the industrial
and economic policy followed in the direction of fast economic development. In
evaluating Japan’s economic success, many scholars, such as Johnson and Katz see
Japan as embodying a state-guided capitalist developmental system in which MITI
(Ministry of International Trade and Industry) and industrial and economic policy
have played a central role. In this view, government leadership has been the key to
Japan’s economic success, with business a willing follower. Through this 40-year
period of economic prosperity, the power of the LDP has remained strong.

Tilton (1996, p.285) mentioned that the state had successfully boosted Japan’s
economic growth by implementing industrial and economic policies to direct the
economy toward high growth sectors. The principal functions of the industrial policy
were allocating resources to favored sectors. It can do so through policies
(non-market forces) that directly provided resources to industry, such as tax breaks,
loans, subsidies, and import protection. These sorts of industrial and economic
policies could help speed up the economic development of Japan and help the ruling
party LDP to maintain social stability in the LDP-dominant regime.

Japan in the pre-1990s was a deformed “dual economy” unique in the industrial
world. Dual economy captures the way in which a set of coalitional and institutional
structures entrenched a form of political capitalism at home while pursuing a
relentlessly internationalist strategy aboard and the formation of dual economy relied
on a series of trade-offs and compensation for the domestic sector, thereby creating a
kind of dualist economy (Jayasuriya, 2003, p.339).

Some other scholars such as Ozawa, Bai and Pempel have also examined the
economic structure and the subsequent industrial policy of Japan in the pre-1990
decades. Ozawa (2001a, p.489) argued that Japan was once successful in nurturing
dynamic comparative advantages and climbing up the ladder of industrial upgrading,
while Bai (1997, p.176) had a similar interpretation on Japan’s economy
development and public policy; he mentioned that “the Japanese state restrained
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market competition in strategic industries through intensive government regulations.
To nurture the competitiveness of Japanese companies in strategic industries, the
state continued to restrain imports of foreign exchange” (Pempel, 1997, p.332).
Spruce (1994, p.118) also stated that under the influence of the United States,
Japan “translated into zero-sum mercantilism where exports are pursued with a
near-military, societal totality and any unwanted imports discouraged by all possible
means” and “exports were approached through societal organised predatory trading
practices, including dumping, direct and indirect subsidies, market collusion, and the
planned destruction of entire foreign national industries, all connected with
nationally organised technological leap-frogging”.
Pempel (1997; 1998) has more detailed explanations on the term of
mercantilism. He argued that mercantilism seeks to advance the macroeconomic
interests of a nation-state through catch-up policies involving the protection and
nurturance of domestic industries. Japan’s mercantilism was different from the more
internationally pervasive doctrines of laissez-faire and economic liberalism. It is a
form of government that treasures the small intervention by the government and that
any intervention would harm the economic development and result in inefficiency of
resource allocation. The protective industrial and economic policies of Japan, as well
as their policy devices, such as import restriction or the allocation of foreign currency,
were the characteristics of Japanese capitalism. This strengthened its international
competitive power for high economic growth and kept foreign intervention out of
Japan under the LDP ruling in the pre-1990s (Makoto, 1999). Most importantly,
under the mechanism was further strengthened the cohesion between the LDP,
business sectors as well as the agriculture sector. By providing a favourable
environment for development, these interest groups in return provided funding,
blocks of loyal voters and local organizational networks for the LDP to ensure
victory in every election.

Based on the explanations of the scholars on the industrial and economic policy
of Japan in the pre-1990s period, the LDP government implemented five main
policies which consisted of the following important aspects.
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First, the promotion of export trade in high-value-added and internationally
competitive environment resulted in a relatively successful exporting industry which
largely benefited telecommunications, banking, finance, construction and real estate
industries etc. While at the same time, restricting imports to protect some of Japan’s
strategically important industries or infant industries (those industries which had
potential and are important for the future development) including automobile,
electronics and computer in order to protect them and keep them away from the
international competition before the industries have been developed as competitive
as the outside world. Second, policies on promoting exports included special
deprecation allowances to promote investment in designated machinery by
designated industries, permitted a firm with rising exports to claim a special
depreciation equal to the product of the increase in its export / sales ratio etc. For
some key exporting industries, like steel, the subsidy was huge, in some years in the
pre-1990s amounting to as much as 25 percent of profits (Katz, 1998, p.49). A host of
other export incentives were also offered, such as special tax deductions, exemption
from anti-cartel provisions, lower borrowing rates and special tax status from firms
with substantial increases in exports, tax deferments, and in some cases overt
subsidization (Katz, 1998; Kosai, 1998; Tsuruta, T, 1998; Itoh et al, 1998; Tilton,
1996; Yoshimatsu, 2000; Uriu, 1996).

Moreover, thirdly, the LDP government set up of import quotas for restricting
imports into Japan. A HKSBC report (1989) mentioned that until the early 1960s,
anyone wishing to import had to seek foreign exchange from MITI and all
commercial items imported into Japan were automatically approved if they are not
subject to import quotas and if they carried a value of less then 5 million yen or its
equivalent in foreign currencies. For items subject to the import quota system,
importers must apply to MITI for an “import allocation certificate” which was
specified in MITI’s import trade control order notices. All Japanese industrial
policies have been designed, implemented, and justified by the MITI. MITI has been
quick to argue market failure, so-called excessive competition, and hence seek for
government intervention. This situation existed until the early 1990s. Fourth, the
government also controlled the foreign exchange market. Foreign Exchange and
Foreign Trade Control Law (FEFTCL) and the Foreign Investment Law (FIL)
provided a framework which controlled foreign exchange transactions until the end
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of 1980s. The regulatory framework included the imposition of a strict quota system
over the allocation of foreign currency used for imports. The FEFTCL based on
“negative principle” whereby all foreign exchange transactions were effectively
prohibited, except for those explicitly allowed by the government. Fifth, the
government also posted restrictions on establishing foreign-owned subsidiaries in
order to protect the mechanism and avoid the influence from international market.
Encarnation (1992, p.184) mentioned that only a small number of foreign-owned
subsidiaries were approved in Japan during the 1950s and early 1960s. Accordingly,
during the 1950s Japan was a less popular host for the U.S. foreign investment than
any other industrialized country. Furthermore, under the foreign investment law of
1950, all instances of inward and outward foreign direct investment, including
technology licensing agreements, that is the purchase of patients rights or know-how,
required not only a license issued by the MOF, but also the approval of the newly
created Foreign Investment Bureau of MITI. Under the LDP dominant regime upto
the pre-1990s, permission for foreigners to acquire or set up production facilities or
subsidiaries in Japan proved more difficult to obtain than permission to enter
technology agreements (Mason, 1992; Flath, 2000). All the above policies aimed to
keep all domestic industries and business sectors protected in a closed economy.

Under the LDP hegemony, the interesting thing is that if Japan was to really act
in its own self-interest, considering the welfare costs imposed on the country as a
whole, it would open its borders to trade. Such a move would, in the long run,
increase Japan’s domestic welfare, and the welfare of all of its trade partners.
However, the politicians were bowing to the wishes of powerful special interest
groups – such as the rice farmers - and refused to liberalized. The pre-1990 economic
and industrial policies which were mainly led by the idea of mercantilism; it can be
believed that Japan’s stubborn stance ultimately seemed to be more political than
economic in the LDP dominant regime.

When one takes a good look at the statistics presented in the thesis, it should be
quite clear that trade liberalization is a good policy. However, as rice farmers provide
votes and Japanese politicians depend on these votes for their survival, although they
did make a few minor compromises, the Japan continued to refuse to reduce its trade
restrictions. The price of rice is much lower from international trade, at the peak of
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such protectionist policies in 1985, Japan records that imports of rice from the US
barely totaled 0.2% of total domestic consumption which Japanese suffered from the
high price of rice. In fact, until very recently, Japan has been closed to virtually all
rice imports. Agriculture, a lagging, not a leading growth sector, also received special
help and almost all government subsidy payments go to agriculture, not industry until
early 1990s. As discussed, the LDP got significant support from business sector and
farmers in the election, by implementing these policies; definitely, it was favorable
for the LDP to keep its close cohesion with and influence to the business sectors as
well as the agriculture sector.
This was a major factor in the breakdown of negotiations (Azuma, 2001, p.241).
Because of financial support from corporations, business interest groups and
agricultural section were generally more independent of political parties than other
groups. Both Keidanren and the Keizai Doyu Kai, for example, indicated a
willingness to talk with the socialists in the wake of the political scandals of 1988-89
and also suggested that the LDP might form a coalition government with an
opposition party in the LDP-led coalition. Yet through these organizations they and
other top business groups provided the LDP with its largest source of party funding
and vote support.

1.2 Social and Welfare policy in the pre-1990 period
The welfare expansion during the first ten years after 1945 was limited. Under
LDP ruling, the characteristics are pro-business and anti-welfare direction, it was
commonly found that the post war Japan allocated most of its resources in
developing its economy. Therefore, during this period, much of the national effort
was focused on social and economic reconstruction. Although a number of welfare
measures were introduced, most of them were reforms of similar policies which had
existed before the end of the war, and all of them were aimed at establishing a
minimum level of livelihood for people and particularly disadvantaged groups of
people such as children, lone mother families and the disabled (Peng, 2000, p.87).
However, even though social and welfare policies are important for the protection of
needy in the society, they were not the priority of the LDP government which the
government expenditure on welfare service still kept at low level.
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Throughout the 1980s, LDP government sought to reduce the budget deficits by
re-establishing the “Japanese-style welfare society”. The policy aim of completing
the construction of a western-style welfare state was now criticized as having been
misguided, and the new theme emphasized reactivation of the “traditional” family
and community ties.

A variety of welfare reforms were introduced to encourage individual self-help
and family mutual support, and to cut public welfare expenditure. For example, free
health care services for the elderly (Elderly Health Care Programme) were eliminated
in 1982, and replaced by a new surcharge system. The Health Insurance and Pension
schemes also went through a series of reforms during the 1980s. These resulted in
substantial increases in individual contribution rates and, in the case of the pensions,
also a raise in pension age from 60 to 65. As wages were linked with the years of
service or age, Japan’s age-wage profile was steeper than in the U.S. or U.K. Because
of the human capital formation, MPL can be raised through extensive training and
experience. This social and welfare policy arrangement definitely contributes to
economic development.

In the area of Public Assistance and the Child-rearing Allowances for Lone
Mother Families, the eligibility criteria were substantially tightened to “weed out
welfare frauds” and to strengthen individual self-sufficiency and the family's welfare
obligation (Peng 1997b, p.61).

By 1992 the total number of recipients of Public Assistance was reduced to
two-thirds of the 1980 level, from 1.42 million to 930,000 people (Ono, 1997, p.83).
The number of lone mother families receiving the Childrearing Allowance also
dropped by 10 per cent from 647,606 to 588,782 between 1985 and 1990, while the
proportion of those receiving Public Assistance fell by 50 per cent during the same
period. On the other hand, a series of tax reforms were introduced to enable
“traditional” two- and three-generation households to take on a greater share of
welfare responsibilities. A special tax break for a housewife's part-time income was
introduced in the same year allowing married women to earn up to yen1 million a
year tax-free. A new tax credit for families co-residing with elderly parents was also
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introduced in 1984, along with a significant tax break for families purchasing houses
built for three-generation co-residency or for home renovations for the purpose of
accommodating elderly family members. Finally, a number of other tax benefits for
families caring for elderly relatives were also introduced during this time. It is not
difficult to see that all these policies were aimed at strengthening the traditional
family arrangements and reasserting the welfare responsibilities of the individual and
the family and most important which helped to minimize the government and public
burden regarding to the serious aging problem in Japan (Ono, 1997, p.62).

To conclude, in the pre-1990 period, the Japanese governmental budget for social
welfare allocation was limited and was quite a different pattern from the one
emerging in Europe especially in high-welfare countries like Sweden. The LDP
government had long avoided sweeping and costly nationwide programs in health
care, retirement benefits, or other social welfare measures. The government only
provided a “safety net” that maintaining a low level of benefits for those in need.

1.3 Foreign policies in the pre-1990 period
Defense, security, and foreign policy have always been critical elements of
Japan’s political economy and had been closely linked with the ruling government. It
is noted that Japan in the post WWII era has been characterized by more international
passivity, especially the post WWII era in which the foreign policies of the LDP
government were very close to the policies and interests of the United States. The
LDP targeted the economic prosperity of Japan as the main nation goal and so its
foreign policies were designed to achieve that goal.

Given the overriding importance of economic factors in foreign relations, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked closely with the Ministry of Finance on matters
of customs, tariffs, international finance, and foreign aid; with the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (MITI) on exports and imports; and with the
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries on questions of foreign agricultural
imports and fishing rights. Yet as the postwar generation of leaders and policymakers
began to assume a greater role in government decision making and as public attitudes
on foreign policy issues matured, there were indications that foreign affairs were
78

being conducted on the basis of a more stable consensus.

As is well-known, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was closely
associated with the conservative, pro-United States position, while opposition parties
often staked out positions at odds with the status quo. Japan's foreign policy goals
during most of the pre-1990s period were essentially to regain economic viability
and establish its credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. During
the pre-1990s, foreign policy actions were guided by two basic principles: close
cooperation with the United States for both security and economic reasons; and
international cooperation through the United Nations (UN). Adherence to these
principles worked well and contributed to phenomenal economic recovery and
growth during the first two decades after the end of the occupation. National security
was entrusted to the protective shield and nuclear umbrella of the United States. The
LDP had brought together various candidates and their supporting interest groups
and had reached a policy consensus to pursue economic development while
depending strongly on the United States security umbrella.

There was no doubt that Japan relied on the military security of the United
States, especially in the early years of the LDP government in which Japan was
closely linked with the United States through the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, which
provided the broad pattern of the military and security ties between the two countries.
Bowen (1992, p.57) stated that “since the war Japan’s defense alliance with the
United States has had an enormous impact on foreign policy, both inhibiting and
aiding Japan’s relations with other states.”

Katzenstein (1996, p.21) stated that the US-Japan Security Treaty provided the
broad definitions of military and security ties between the two countries with few
significant changes since its ratification in 1960. The closeness between the two
countries in the LDP dominant regime was reflected in the continuation of U.S. bases
on Japanese soil, institutional links between the two countries’ militaries, joint
military exercises, technology-sharing and co-production agreements, extensive
intelligence exchanges, and others. The relationship between them was so close that
they have been viewed as a “marriage” with each other (Frost, 1987; Shindo, 1989).
Some scholars, nonetheless, argued that the Americans routinely labelled Japan an
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“international free rider”. American spent 5-6 percent of its GNP on maintaining its
military supremacy, while Japan, committed to nonaggression formalized by its
“peace constitution” and protected by the United States-Japan security treaty –
limited its military spending about 1 percent of GNP (Islam, 1993, p.62).

Besides Japan’s pro-US approach, the foreign policy of Japan in the pre-1990
displayed on unwillingness to take a more active leadership on a variety of
international problems or engaging in international issues, since most of the
resources were placed on the economic development. In the pre-1990s, Japan had
low posture in international relations because most of the energy and time were spent
on the economic development through promoting the export aggressively (Pempel,
1997; 1998). Moreover, because of the unwillingness to take an active role in
international affairs, until the 1980s Japan had no significant foreign aid programme
and even then, most of the programmes had been focused on aid to Asia. The pro-US
stance of the LDP government was characterized by its conservative nature after the
WWII and she was not active in uplifting her international status. Most of her foreign
policies just closely followed the direction of the US.

Nationally, political challenges to the LDP dominance waxed and waned later in
the 1980s as the party faced major influence-peddling scandals with weak and
divided leadership. In 1989 the opposition Japan Socialist Party won control of the
Diet's House of Councillors. But the Japan Socialist Party's past ideological positions
on foreign policy appeared to be more of a liability than an asset going into the HR
elections in 1990, and the party attempted to modify a number of positions that called
for pushing foreign policy to the left. In contrast, the LDP standard bearer, Prime
Minister Kaifu Toshiki, used identification with the United States and the West to his
advantage in the successful LDP effort to sustain control of the HR in February 1990.
It revealed that there was great support among the public to the pro-US approach of
the Japanese foreign policy, which the LDP definitely could claim credit due to its
solid close relationship with the U.S..

On economic front, a specific example of Japan's close cooperation with the
United States included its quick response to the United States call for greater host
nation support from Japan following the rapid realignment of Japan-United States
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currencies in the mid-1980s. The currency realignment resulted in a rapid rise of
United States costs in Japan, which the Japanese government, upon United States
request, was willing to offset.

Diplomatically, another set of examples was provided by the LDP government's
willingness to respond to United States requests for foreign assistance to countries
considered of strategic importance to the West. Japan's response to the United States
decision to help to protect tankers in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-88). During the 1980s, United States officials voiced appreciation for Japan's
"strategic aid" to countries such as Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Jamaica. Prime
Minister Kaifu Toshiki's pledges of support for East European and Middle Eastern
countries in 1990 fit the pattern of Japan's willingness to share greater responsibility
for world stability. Japan's leaders welcomed the reassertion of United States military
power. We can see the LDP government devoted their full support to the United State,
in the Asian and world affairs following the Islamic revolution in Iran, the United
States hostage crisis, and the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan, all of which
occurred in late 1980s.

To conclude, the three most important public policies of Japan had been
discussed beforehand, including the industrial and economic policies, social and
welfare policies as well as the foreign policies. It was noted that the pre-1990 period
was dominated by the LDP and at that period of time, most of the resources had been
allocated for developing the economic situation of Japan and the close cohesion
between political party, business sector and bureaucracy made Japan became strong
again in economics. That is why in the pre-1990 period, the Japanese government
strongly promoted the export of products but on the other side, restricting imports
from other nations in order to prevent the negative impacts on the exports of the
domestic industries. Furthermore, due to most of the resources being allocated to the
economic development, it was common sense that resources allocated for the social
welfare policies should be limited. By the same token, the social and welfare policies
were also developed in line with the policy direction of the LDP. Last but not least,
the foreign policies were very close to America, to large extent, all these major
policies were guided by the political monopoly – the LDP in the one-party
dominance regime.
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2. Regime Change: Public Policies in the 1990 period

2.1 Industrial and economic policies in the 1990 period
After achieving one of the highest economic growth rates in the world from the
1960s through the 1980s, the Japanese economy slowed dramatically in the early
1990s, when the "bubble economy" collapsed. The economic stagnancy uprooted the
LDP hegemonic dynasty and led to its replacement by a new multiparty system,
which also caused a shift of public policy direction in Japan. Over the 1990s decade
Japanese public policies have changes significantly, the differences and contrasts
between the pre-1990s and the 1990s were clear in the public policy paradigm. From
the policies changed in the 1990s, evidences were found to present that the industrial
and economic policies, social and welfare policies as well as the foreign policies
have been altered. The more from LDP dominance to LDP-led coalitions changed all
the three types of policies, as will be argued in the following sections.

The mercantilism policy adopted by the LDP government in the pre-1990 period
involved macroeconomic policies that were carried out in the approximately the first
twenty-five years after WWII, resting on “developmentalist” catch-up. These policies
basically included extensive economic planning; industrial organization; protection
of domestic manufacturers, financial institutions and agricultural settings; limits on
foreign penetration of Japanese markets as well as on Japanese firms moving aboard,
which in return devoted their full support to the LDP’s ruling in the LDP one-party
dominant regime. (Encarnation, 1992; Kosai, 1988; Tsuruta, 1988; Itoh et al., 1988;
Yoshimatsu, 2000; Tilton, 1996; Trevor, 2001; Flath, 2000; Katz, 1998).

The policy tools serving these goals were many: high tariffs, and restrictive
quotas on most manufactured imports, tight control over domestic consumption,
restrictions on capital and technology flows into and out of Japan, a systematically
undervalued yen that made Japanese exports cheap in world markets, a very
restricted bond market, policies to encourage high personal savings by citizens, and a
strong reliance on foreign technology purchases. Together with the close relationship
of the anchors in the “Iron triangle” and the high consensus in the society, this made
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Japan be the economic giant in the world.

However, the industrial and economic polices have changed much by the
mid-1990s. Lincoln (1988) and Pempel (1998) stated that in the 1990s, Japan’s
capital markets and its currency had become deeply integrated into world markets
and the influence of the government on the public policies decreased mainly because
the adoption of liberalization in the 1990s. One of the most important changes in
policy environment is that government is no longer dominated by the LDP, but an
allied coalition. As discussed, “Iron Triangle” formed a powerful cohesion between
the LDP, business sectors, bureaucracy as well as agriculture sector in the LDP
dominance regime. However, this cohesion changed in the 1990s with the great
pressure from the public to strive for “clean government”. This change of
relationship among the anchors in the “Iron Triangle” together with the changes in
economic environment, the new coalition government’s ruling have affected
substantially the goals, policy instruments, and policy environment in Japan.
Following the complaints, the US and other countries began to put heavy pressure on
Japan to open its market. Although slow to respond initially, due to these rules of
game changed, Japan has begun to liberalize its market.

First, the Japanese government adopted the appreciation of the Japanese yen. It
was fixed at 360 to the U.S. dollar from 1947 until 1971, but then went from 145 by
mid-1998 to around 120 to one dollar in 2001 (Business Times, 21 August 2001). It
was noted that the appreciation of yen was due to the less government control over
monetary policy. Second, revised of the Foreign Exchange and Control Law (1980)
and the deregulation of the corporate market, which meant that by the mid-1990s,
individual Japanese were free to issue bonds abroad in whatever was the most
suitable currency and the swap the proceeds into yen. And by 1996, cumulative
Japanese investment abroad totaled nearly $500 billion, making Japan the world’s
second-largest overseas investor. Japan definitely benefited from the active
involvement in international business activities which also helped Japan to recover
from the recession.

Third, Japan becomes more international in production and global investment
strategies. By the mid and late 1990s large number of Japanese manufacturing firms
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were basing in their activities less on production in and export from Japan and far
more on truly international production and global investment strategies. The
Japanese offshore market grew from nearly nothing in 1985 to almost half a trillion
dollars in 1991. Even though there were signs of decline during economic recession,
the affiliates were still in a relatively large increase comparing with the pre-1990
period of time. Third, the government also carried out reducing tariff and trade
barriers. Pressures from the United States and the Europeans focused on Japanese
reductions of tariff barriers, import quotas, and various non-tariff barriers. The
United States and other European countries’ pressure became increasingly sector
specific to reduce the trade deficit between nations and lead on voluntary export
agreements, with France being particularly successful in gaining Japanese consent to
restrict exports in colour televisions, cars, light commercial vehicles, motorcycles etc.
and even accept a voluntary export restraint (VER) (McCraw, 1990, p.58). Last but
not the least, the Japanese government also increased forming strategic alliances.
Many Japanese firms, including many subcontractors, added to their multinational
character by forging strategic alliances with foreign-owned firms. In the 1990s, Japan
employed both market and non-market strategies to form alliances with
foreign-owned firms. Burton and Saelens (1994, p.73) stated that amongst the
Japanese firms that forged partnership with foreign firms were Toyota and Nissan in
auto manufacture; Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba in electronics; Nippon
Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) and International Telegram and Telephone (KDD) in
telecommunications and etc. The joint ownership of the firms undermined the
mercantilist orientations that the Japanese companies should be protected by
restricting cooperation and competition with the external markets and also often the
ties to the keiretsu and also reduced the level of government in manipulating the
industrial and economic policies of Japan. Most importantly, liberalization brought
large pressure on the cohesion of the LDP and interest groups, which final lead to the
change of “Iron Triangle”.

As mentioned, votes from agriculture sector was very critical for the LDP in the
election. It is interesting to see the situation of agriculture sector after the
liberalization in the LDP-led coalition regime.
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In 2000 consumers spent over 1% of their income ($638 per individual) to cover
the merely the difference between domestic and world rice prices. This problem
directly affects an individual when he/she goes shopping at the local market. Data
shows that Japanese consumers pay roughly $2.63 per kilogram compared to the US
price of $.20 per kilogram (Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry [MAFF], 2001).
Other welfare losses are shouldered by the government, which then taxes consumers
and imposes further welfare losses. One example of such expenditures is storage
costs. As indicated previously, the government has agreed to pay the difference to
producers when the domestic price falls below a predetermined standard. It
accomplishes this by buying surplus rice stocks at the predetermined price. The
government has then chosen to store the rice rather than export it, and this then
requires increased taxes to provide for the storage facilities.
Through the liberalization, the changes in industrial and economic policies
especially in the rice sectors could be categorized in the following aspects.
In the 1990s, Japan has been gradually reducing trade barriers. (United States
Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2002). Figure 1 illustrates a few of these effects.
Note that when consumption exceeds production, storage volumes and the associated
expenses increase. Also interesting to note is the import level of nearly zero until
1993. The lack of imports can be taken as evidence of the welfare loss experienced
by consumers.

When the specific data is considered, Japan is one of the highest cost rice
producers in the world; on the other hand, other countries, such as Burma enjoy some
of the lowest production costs, (Yap, 1991). In the event that the trade between the
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two countries was to be completely liberalized, Japanese consumers would likewise
benefit from the liberalization through the increased supply and subsequent decline
in prices. From the above table, we can note that in the pre-1990 import of near no
rice imported from abroad due to the mercantilism and protective policy adopted by
the LDP government. Under liberalization, rice has been imported since 1990s due to
the great international pressure. No doubt that Japanese rice farmers are facing a
great challenge which have ever met before. Agriculture liberalization further loosens
the cohesion of the LDP and farmers in the new regime. By-elections for the HC in
1992 also showed less support for the LDP from the agricultural sector (Berger, 1981;
Kuo et al, 1992).

The above characteristics are some major elements of changes in industrial and
economic policies of Japan in the post-1990 period due to the change of the
economic environment and political regime. Besides, Frieden (1993), Thorn (1987)
& Turner (1991) stated that Japan has come to dominate international money and
financial markets, and international conditions have become extremely important to
many Japanese firms. Japan’s rise to predominance has been almost as rapid as that
of the United States during and after WWI. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
figures were 20 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI), 25 percent of equities, 55
percent of bonds, and 50 percent of short-term bank outflows compared with only 2 –
15 percent of above sessions in the 1960 and the late 1970s. Temporary difficulties in
the 1990s did slow this process, but they were unlikely to alter the overall trend;
Japan’s role in Pacific financial and investment flows was extremely large and likely
to grow larger which Japan being much more pro-active in the international market.

Also, the process has made major Japanese banks and firms far more integrated
into the international financial system. Japanese financial investors and
intermediaries had enormous overseas positions; as of 1991, the international assets
of Japanese banks were $1.9 trillion, one-third of total international bank assets
(Bank of International Settlements, 1991). The integration of Japan into international
financial system reduced the cohesion of the keiretsu and therefore individual
Japanese companies and financial institutions in the mid and late 1990s, free to issue
bonds abroad in whatever was the most suitable currency and then swap the proceeds
into yen. Their dependence on financing from home-based banks diminished sharply
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(Pempel, 1997, p.211).

The above changes in the industrial and economic policies in Japan in the 1990s
period were evidence that Japan could be regarded as undergoing a change from a
mercantilism to an open market economy. The changes in industrial and economic
policy were partially due to the pressure from the international marketing, but also
because of the gradual decline of the LDP dominance in the political regime in Japan
in the LDP-led coalition regime. But, as public policies were formed due to the
decision-making process of the government, we can find although the LDP’s power
has been eroded in the LDP-led coalition government, it still exert its influence to
protect their old partner – rice farmer by issuing enormous subsidies to them.
However, the cohesion of the LDP, business sector and agriculture sector has been
greatly damaged after the liberalization. The LDP lost much of the farmers’ vote in
1993’s election which forced the LDP to form the coalition alliance to regain it
power to the Diet in the new regime.

2.2 Social and welfare policies in the1990 period
In the pre-1990 period, the pattern of welfare development in Japan suggests a
case of retrenchment and most of the resources have been allocated in the economic
restructuring and development due to the LDP priority in economic development.
However, in the 1990s we see quite a different shift. With the collapse of the Bubble
Economy in 1989, it would seem that the predictable thing for the government to do
was to consider strengthening the social welfare service in Japan.

In the 1990s the call for the Japanese-style welfare society had all but
disappeared, and the notion of welfare expansion had re-emerged as an important
policy priority. Indeed, government report after report emphasized the urgent need to
rethink the welfare system and to reinvest in welfare infrastructure. One immediate
outcome of this has been a steady rise in social security expenditure to run a large
scale care- based social welfare program in order to comfort the public anxiety
caused by economic downturn and to gain public support. The post-1993 coalition
government tried its very best to solve and mend the anti-welfare discussion failure
made by pre-1993 LDP government. Although LDP-led government came back to
87

power in 1996, the direction of the social welfare policy did not changed much.
Currently the total social security expenditure in Japan accounts for approximately
one-third of government expenditure.

In fact, by the mid-1990s, social security had become one of the largest items of
the government expenditure and one of the fastest-growing sectors in Japan due to
the change of the LDP dominance to a multi-party system. The coalition government
started to the total national budget expenditure (i.e. all expenditure other than those
for serving national debt and the allocation of tax grant to the local governments). In
1996 it accounted for 14.3 billion yen out of 75 billion yen. Social insurance is the
largest item within the social security expenditure--it accounted for yen 8.5 billion or
60 per cent of the total social security expenditure--while personal social welfare
services accounted for about yen3.8 billion or 27 per cent of the total. The national
budget in Japan is relatively small. Government expenditures have been less than 10
per cent of the GDP since the beginning of the 1980s. In 1996 the ratio of general
government expenditure to GDP was 8.7 per cent (Japan Ministry of Finance, 1997).

Reviews of the social security system in 1989, 1994 and 1995 have led to a
number of new policies and legislation aimed at redesigning the Japanese welfare
system. Particularly, significant changes were made in the areas of elder care and
child welfare. These changes have brought about not only a new consensus about an
increased state role in welfare provision, but also a substantial shift in the nature of
social welfare itself.

Before the 1980s social welfare in Japan was largely regarded as serving the
function of poverty relief: that is, that part of social welfare other than social
insurance was mainly focused on cash-based public assistance and related activities
reserved for a relatively small group of people, such as the elderly, the disabled and
lone mother families. However, recent shifts suggest an attempt to make social
welfare more universal, and at the same time to shift its focus from cash-based
assistance to care-based social services. The social welfare trajectory in the 1990s
seems to reflect this new direction.

Currently the two main loci of social welfare in Japan are the Chronic Care
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Insurance and child care reform. The services paid for by the insurance include: a
variety of domiciliary care such as home help, bathing, visiting nurse, rehabilitation;
the cost of equipment for domiciliary care such as wheelchairs and special bathroom
equipment; the cost of approved home repairs and renovations; high levels of care for
those with higher degrees of disability; and the cost of institutional care for those
living in institutions. The scheme will operate as a mandatory public social insurance,
the cost of which will be borne by all citizens over the age of 40. For those who are
between the ages of 40 and 64 the insurance fee will be simply added on to the
existing health insurance, while for those over the age of 65.

In terms of child welfare a similar shift towards an increased state and market
role in the provision of care can be seen. A new child care policy was introduced in
1994 as a part of a larger child welfare reform known as the Angel Plan. Its aims are
to provide a wide range of support to families with children, and to create a positive
environment for families to have more children. This policy so far has led to an
expansion in a number of public childcare services. Over the last few years some
local governments have become more lenient in their day-care needs assessment for
publicly funded day-care spaces.

Besides Chronic Care Insurance and child care reform that was established in the
post 1990 period, the long-term care insurance (LTCI) has been implemented, with
the exception that the premium payments by the insured started six month later. The
Long-term care insurance is the first comprehensive policy instrument to tackle the
problems of the ageing population. The estimated number of the aged who need
LTCI was 2.8 million (Aspalter & Lai, 2003).

It is important to point out here, however, that although significant, these changes
by no means indicate that the Japanese state has now replaced the family or the
corporate sector in providing social welfare, it was just a symbol of the changes of
the needs of the society as well as changes in policy making of a LDP-led coalition
government.

Indeed, while the changes are significant, the fact is that the level of

the state provision before this was so low that even with the most optimistic level of
increase it will still be a while before the Japanese welfare state will reach the level
of many of the European ones in terms of service provision.
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2.3 Foreign policies in the 1990 period
In the LDP-led regime since 1993, it appears clear to observers in Japan that the
majority of the Japanese public and elite are satisfied with the general direction of
Japan's foreign policy. That policy direction is characterized by continued close ties
with the United States to sustain world stability and prosperity that are so beneficial
to Japan, and incrementally more assertive Japanese policies, especially regarding
international economic and political institutions and Asian affairs. Beyond its
immediate neighbors, the LDP-led coalition government has also pursued a more
active foreign policy in recent years, recognizing the responsibility that accompanies
its economic strength. It has expanded ties with the Middle East, which provides
most of its oil. Japan increasingly is active in Africa and Latin America and has
extended significant support to development projects in both regions.

It is noted that Japanese security policy has been largely passive and reactive in
recognition of Japan’s deference toward the United States due to the close
relationship of the LDP and the United States in the pre-1990 LDP one-party
dominant regime. As the armed forces (Self-Defense Forces) were constrained by
ideology and legal and political frameworks, Japan has relied heavily on economic
levers, such as investment and financial aid, to exercise influence abroad.

After several decades as long-standing military allies and increasingly
interdependent economic partners, Japan and the United States cooperated closely to
build a strong, multifaceted relationship based on democratic values and interests in
world stability and development. These two societies and economies became
increasingly intertwined. On the economic front, in the 1990s their combined gross
national product totaled about one third of the world's GNP. Japan received about 11
percent of United States exports (a larger share than any other country except
Canada), and the United States bought about 34 percent of Japan's exports. Japan had
US$148 billion in direct investment in the United States in 1991, while the United
States had more than US$17 billion invested in Japan. Some US$100 billion in
United States government securities held by institutions in Japan helped finance
much of the United States budget deficit. Economic exchanges were reinforced by a
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variety of scientific, technical, tourist, and other exchanges. Each society continued
to see the other as its main ally in Asia and the Pacific. Certain developments in the
late 1980s damaged bilateral relations. Nevertheless, public opinion surveys
continued to reveal that substantial majorities of Japanese and Americans believed
that the bilateral relationship was vital to both countries. The importance regarding to
the close relationship with the United States definitely cannot be undermined.

In the domestic political system, from the lesson of the 1990’s HR election as
mentioned in the previous section, in 1993 although the coalition government
overthrow the LDP one party dominance government, Prime Minister Hosokawa
Morihiro pledged to continue the LDP policy of economic and security ties with the
United States; of responding to domestic and international expectations of greater
Japanese political and economic contributions; and of international cooperation
through the UN and other international organizations in the cause of world peace,
disarmament, aid to developing countries, and educational and technical cooperation.
Foreign policy speeches by the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs
were widely disseminated, which the new government continued to follow the
existing pro-US approach and no great changes in the pro-US approach when
compared with the LDP-one party dominance regime in term of the foreign policy.

Also, in the LDP-lead coalition regime which the strong pro-US stance of the
LDP is still existed in Japan in terms of its foreign policy direction, but definitely the
LDP-led government would work towards a direction which can satisfy the political
aspiration of various parties, especially the JSP which has a relatively strong in
socialist background. Therefore the minor shift in her stance in foreign policies were
proved to exist in the LDP-led government, partially due to the fact that the LDP-led
coalitions had less autonomy, meaning that the coalition government is led by the
LDP, but not dominated by the LDP.

The nation's phenomenal economic growth had made it a ranking world
economic power and had generated a sense of pride and self-esteem, especially
among the younger generation. Moreover, after the long recession the LDP-led
government also strived for a more internationalism foreign policy in order to fasten
the economic recovery of Japan as soon as possible. In the LDP-led coalition regime,
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government not only adopted pro-US approach, in this new regime also it also
strived for internationalism with more independence from the United States. Japan
has expressed greater interest in global recognition of Japan as a major power.
Moreover, to adopt more internationalism also it is very important for the LDP to
gain more support and recognition from the young generation instead of old farmers
alone.

By the 1990s Japan had moved into notable roles in a number of regional
organizations such as the Asia Development Bank, APEC, Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council (PECC), the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), and the
Pacific Trade and Development Conference (PAFTAD) (Pempel, 1998). Also, in the
1990s, Japan became the world's largest creditor, an increasingly active investor in
the United States, and a major contributor to international debt relief, financial
institutions, and other assistance efforts. Moreover, Japan had become less dependent
on the Western powers for resources. Oil, for example, was obtained directly from
the producing countries and not from the Western-controlled multinational
companies. Other important materials also came increasingly from sources other than
the United States and its allies, while trade with the United States as a share of total
trade dropped significantly. Thus, political leaders began to argue that in the interests
of economic self-preservation, more attention should be paid to the financial and
development needs of other countries, especially those that provided Japan with vital
energy and raw material supplies.

The increased Japanese internationalism was also shown through overseas
assistance. By the early 1990s, Japan’s share of official development aid made it the
largest or the second largest contributor worldwide. Moreover, in the 1990s, an
increasing portion of Japanese aid was given via international financial institutions
such as World Bank and Asia Development Bank. Uriu ( 2004, p.172) stated that in
the war of Iraq, as early as in April 2003, Japan announced a series of small
humanitarian aid packages. Just prior to US President George W. Bush’s visit to
Tokyo in October 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi promised that Japan would give
$1.5 billion for FY 2004, earmarked for the provision of electricity, water, medical
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assistance, and education. In the end, Japan pledged a total of more than $5 billion to
help in the reconstruction effort in Iraq over the next four years. This amount to
about 10% of the World Bank’s initial estimate of reconstruction costs and made
Japan the largest foreign contributor.

The most important shift in its policy should be the willingness of Japan to use
its troops overseas and the amendment of the nature of the Japan Self-Defense Force
(JSDF). Roy (2004, p.91) argued that the JSDF has expanded their activities. Since
1992 the JSDF has participated in UN peace-keeping operations in several points of
the world. The JSDP also contributed to the US attack on Afghanistan after 9-11. In
June 2003, Japan’s Parliament passed three war contingency bills. These were the
Law regarding Response to Armed Attacks, the Law on the Establishment of the
Security Council, and the Law on the Establishment of the Security Council of Japan,
and the Law to amend the Self-Defense Force (SDF). The law allows the government
to put the SDF on standby when it determines that a military attack is “anticipated”.
Some scholars, such as Pempel and Calder also stated that the active involvement in
the international affairs is one of the tricks of the LDP-led coalition government to
shift the society focus from domestic economic downturn to the international arena.

Although postwar Japan is reputedly “disarmed”, the JSDF is substantial, with
around 250,000 military personnel and an official annual budget of approximately
US$50 billion, the world’s second highest. Japan has deployed some means of
projecting military power, such as submarines armed with Harpoon missiles (Shuja,
2004). The JSDF in March 2003 launched its first dual-use surveillance satellites to
spy on North Korea and in 2003. Japanese fighters, with airborne refueling assistance
from a U.S. tanker aircraft crossed the northern Pacific to participate in military
exercises in Alaska along with contingents from the United States, Thailand, South
Korea, Singapore, and India. This marked the first time Japanese military aircraft
have trained in the continental United States (Roy, 2004, p.87).

Moreover, Japan in 2003 decided to move ahead more aggressively on missile
defense. The LDP-led coalition government has expressed a growing interest in a
system since 1998, when North Korea launched a missile that flow over Japan
territory. Early in 2003, however, Japan officials began to seriously consider
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purchasing and deploying a U.S. made system as early as 2006. The proposed system
would involve missiles launched from Aegis-equipped destroyers with ground-based
Patriot missile batteries as a backup. In August 2003, The Defense Agency issued a
plan calling for a tenfold increase in spending on missile defense, to $1.2 billion in
2004, followed by annual outlays of $1 billion though 2007 (Uriu, 2004).

In regard to the sending troops overseas, Uriu (2004, p.177) mentioned that is it
best explained by the U.S. war on Iraq. In early December 2003, the government
released detailed guidelines for the eventual deployment of 1,000 SDF personnel.
Japan then sent 550 soldiers from the Ground Self-Defense Force and 150 members
of the Air Self-Defense Force, along with four military transport planes.

To conclude, this chapter focused on the changes of the public policy paradigm
of Japan in the pre-1990 and post-1990s. The public policy paradigm of the Japan in
the pre-1990s period was rather a close nation with protective industrial and
economic policy with mercantilism, anti-welfare approach towards the social-welfare
service and pro-US approach in the foreign policy. The Japan domestic policy
environment has been quite favorable for industrial policy and for economic policy
generally. High priority is given in Japanese government policy making to economic,
social welfare issues, domestic and international. Societal norms stress the
importance of harmony through cooperation and at least form of consensus in
Japanese society. In Japan these relationships are seen as positive-sum, not zero-sum,
game. And business in Japan has benefited substantially from the continuance in
power of the pro-business, conservative Liberal-Democratic party ever since 1955.
The close connection of the big business and small business and the agricultural
sectors provided a strong support for these public policies that were adopted by the
government in the LDP dominant regime. We can said the LDP’s stance in public
policy in the pre-1990s seemed to be more political than economic which the policy
is a powerful tool for the LDP to maintain its superiority in the LDP dominance
regime.

The change in the regime in the 1990 together with the change in the
international environment caused substantial changes in the public policies of the
Japan in the new LDP-lead coalition regime in the 1990s. The Japanese government
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adopted a more liberalized and international approach towards the industrial and
economic and foreign policies. The change of public policy paradigm is businesslike,
the further enhancement in social-welfare policy and the liberalization definitely
benefited the Japanese welfare. However, in return this also brought a blow to the
Iron Triangle, which further loosen the cohesion of the LDP, business and agriculture
sector and changed the rule of game in the political system in Japan.
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Chapter Five

Conclusion
The political status of Japan is generally described as extremely constant during
the period of LDP dominance after its formation and coming to power in 1955.
Because of the continuous control of the government enjoyed by the LDP for 38
years, the sudden fall out of power of the LDP in 1993 and the long economic
recession of Japan arrested the attention of the political scientists and economists. In
the 1990s Japan’s political economy was sharply different from what it had been two
or three decades earlier. In the HC, the July 1989 election represented the first time
that the LDP was forced into a minority position. The political crisis in 1993 was
testimony of the regime change in Japan.

Regarding the change of the political situation in Japan, a considerable quantity
literature on the political changes of Japan can be found, yet, most of them focused
on two aspects of Japan, either from political system angle or the economic recession
viewpoint, which cannot provide clear explanation why an unpredictable change
happened in the political economy in Japan in the “Lost Decade” and also fail to
provide an in-depth analysis regarding to change of Japan. Therefore, it is useful to
provide a comprehensive explanation on the changes of Japan in a systematic way. It
was the purpose of the current thesis to provide such a detailed explanation and
analysis on the political change in Japan. The current research would like to argue
that Japan underwent a process of shift in regime; the major change is the LDP
dominant regime of the pre-1990s period transformed to a regime with the LDP less
dominant or say a LDP-led coalitional regime in the post-1993 period. Also, why this
change happened in Japan has been presented with detailed analysis.

The concept of political regime and regime change are very useful in analysis of
the political change of Japan in the “Lost Decade”. The definition of “regime” is very
much linked with the norms, principles and rules of a nation, which are the so-called
rules of the game. Political regime could be used in different levels and domains.
Then the term “regime change” has provided the concepts of the change of the rule
of the game in any regime, which is very favorable for analysis in comparing entire
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systems, to study long-term change and justifies a broader scope.

In the current research, the “regime” model developed by Pempel provides a
tangible outline of the major elements of regime which are taken as the political
institutions, the socio-economic coalitions and the public policy paradigm. Based on
Pempel’s concept, it was argued that Japan was undergoing regime change in the
1990s. With the guidance of the political regime change model and from the
literature review, the change of the rules of the game in these three pillars was
showed to be the most important factor that could explain the regime change in Japan.
As most of the literatures regarding to the political change in Japan were published
by the late 1990s, more updated information could be included in the current
research in order to provide more concrete details for analysis. In the case of Japan,
the change of the rule of the game could help to explain why there was a change of
regime from LDP dominance in the pre-1990s to LDP-led coalitional government in
the 1990s.

The political institutions of Japan definitely underwent a regime change from
the LDP dominance to a regime with the LDP less dominant, which was described in
chapter 2 as a regime of LDP-led coalition rather than LDP dominance. The early
1990s were critical for the development of the political system and the evidence
discussed earlier provided justifications for the change of the rules of the game. The
interrelationships of the LDP with the socio-economic coalition and public policy
were also obvious in the sense that the changes of the LDP resulted in a change in the
other two pillars. For example, the increasingly strong evidence of “money politics”
associated with the LDP led to business and public disillusionment and impacted on
the strength of the “iron triangle”, which in turn impacted back on the LDP’s election
prospects. Together with the change of electoral system in 1994 which changed the
rule of the game further and strengthened the existence of the coalition ruling in the
post-1993 period.

Moving on to the socio-economic coalition, as discussed in chapter 3 the
socioeconomic coalition of the Japan in the pre-1990 period showed a close
connection between the agricultural and business sectors (including big and small
business), bureaucrats and the LDP through the keiretsu and the iron triangle system.
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Close relationships of the LDP with the agricultural and business sectors resulted in a
strong flavour to the policies advocated by the LDP, including mercantilist economic
policies, small budget on social welfare and America-led foreign policies. In the
post-1990 period, the rules of the game in the regime changed in that the connection
between the agricultural sector and the LDP was greatly reduced due to the trade
liberalization and the downgrading of the rural communities. Moreover, through the
linkages of Japanese firms with foreign-owned firms, the keiretsu system was greatly
diminished and big business itself has been divided into two communities – foreign
owned and domestic companies – with tensions between them. These changes in the
rules of the game resulted in less support for the LDP, so its influence declined and
contributed to the regime change with the emergence of the LDP-led coalition.

Regarding the public policies paradigm of Japan which was discussed in chapter
4, Japan’s domestic policy environment had been quite favorable for industrial and
economic policy generally in the pre-1990s. High priority was given by Japanese
government policy-makers to developing economic aspects and less on social
welfare issues. Mercantilism which favoured the domestic industries and prevented
the intervention of the foreigner-owned industries existed in Japan in the pre-1990s
period. Business in Japan benefited substantially from the continuance in power of
the pro-business, conservative LDP. The dominance of the LDP in the pre-1990s
resulted in the formation of public policies that favoured strong and protective
economic policies (mercantilism) in order to put economic development as the first
priority. In that sense, the expenditure on social and welfare policies was limited at
that time. The postwar foreign policies of Japan were clear-cut and favoured the
interests of the United States.

Changes happened in the early 1990s in which the rule of the game in the pillar
of the public policies paradigm changed, mercantilist economic and industrial
policies change to less protective and more market-oriented, caused by the change in
the international environment as well as by the coalition government. The stance of
Japan on foreign policies in the early 1990s seemed to be more international, moving
from followed strictly to the policies adopted by the United States to a more
independent intention; a mix of working closely with the United States on some
issues but acting with more independence on others. The industrial and economic
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policies, the social and welfare policies and the foreign policies changed significantly
in the post-1990 period and these changes of the rules of the game were the
testimonies of the regime change, from LDP dominance to LDP-led coalition.

All these are the change of the rules of the game of Japan in the 1990s. The
regime change approach provides an ideal mode for characterizing the regime of a
country and the theory itself provides a method to analyze the political and
socio-economic changes of Japan. By utilizing Pempel’s framework, we analysed
the regime change in the “political regime” domain at national level. The three main
pillars justifies a broad scope in which the change of the rules of the game in the
political institutions, the socio-economic coalition and the public policy help to
explain why the LDP lost its power in the 1990s and why the LDP-led coalition
regime emerged.

It seems that in the near future, the LDP could not regain its dominance in the
government and coalition governments are likely to continue to form in the future
years. In terms of the socio-economic coalition, with the increase in foreign-owned
enterprises, the traditional cohesive links between the party system and the large
business sector will further diminish. The ways and management style of the
foreign-owned firms might change the management style of Japanese firm. Some
form of “iron triangle” will still exist (even though its cohesion may be reduced to a
large extent). The LDP-led government, the bureaucracy and the business sectors are
still the most influential parties in society. Even though the economic recession in the
early 1990s reduced greatly the profit gained by the business sector, they are still the
largest financial source for the political parties during election and fund-raising. Yet,
their relations changed as the rule of the game changed and their political status is no
longer as constant as before.

In terms of public policies, Japan has been striving for a better economic
development since the early 1990s’ economic recession. The banking system,
especially the bad debts, is the core reason for the continued recession of Japan.
Higher priority will be put on further enhanced the strength and competitiveness of
Japan in the international market. Due to the rapid ageing process in Japan, resources
and ways to handle properly the ageing issue will still be a priority for the Japanese
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government. The resources spent on social and welfare policies should no doubt
increase to a great extent in the near future. As for the foreign policies, moves
towards a more clear and individualized stance on international affairs will appear in
the future, even though a close relationship with America, especially on some large
important issues, will still exist.

By using the theoretical mode of regime change, a more systematic and logical
way of analyzing the recent changes of a regime in Japan was found. Political
institutions, socio-economic coalition and public policy paradigm constituted the
three main pillars of the regime. Consequently, two different and unique regimes in
which the first one was from 1955 to the early 1990s (LDP one party dominance
regime) and the second regime was from 1993 to the early 2000s (LDP-led coalition
regime) have been defined. As the new rules of the game are shaping up the new
regime, the study of the regime change of Japan in the “Lost Decade” will remain
critically important for understanding the future development of Japan. This type of
approach in turn may well have implications for examining and explaining changes
which have been or are being undergone by other countries in which one-party
dominant regimes lose power.

100

References

Allinson, G.. D. (1997). Japan’s postwar history. The United States: Cornell
University Press.
Asahi Shimbun (1999). Daigishi to Kane (Politicians and money). Tokyo.
Asahi Shimbun (September 11, 1998).
Aspalter, C. & Lai, O. K. (2003). Welfare Capitalism in Japan: Past, Recent and
Future Developments. In Aspalter, C. (eds.). Welfare Capitalism Around the World.
Taiwan: Casa Verde Publishing.
Babb, J. (1999). The Precarious Political Balance in Japan. Asian Affairs, 32 (3), p.
154-163.
Baerwald, H. (1986). Party Politics in Japan. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
Bai, G. (1998). Economic Ideology and Japanese Industrial Policy. The United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Bailey, P. J. (1996). Postwar Japan: 1945 to the present. UK & USA: Blackwell
publishers Inc.
Bank of International Settlements (1991). International Banking and Financial
Market Developments during the Second Quarter of 1991. Basle: Bank of
International Settlements.
Berger, S. D. (1981), Regime and Interest Representation: The French Traditional
Middle Class. In Berger, S. D. (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe, The
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Bergsten, C. F. & Noland, M. (1993). Reconcilable Differences? United States –
Japan Economic Conflict. The United States: Institute for International Economics.
Bieda, K. (1970), The Structure and Operation of the Japanese Economy, Australia:
John Wiley & Sons Australasian Pty Ltd.
Block, F. (1978). Political Choice and the Multiple Logics of Capital. Theory and
Society, (15), p.118-131.
Bollen, K, A. (1983). World System Position, Dependence, and Democracy: The
Cross-national Evidence. American Sociological Review, (48), pp.468-479.
Bouissou, J-M. (2002). Japan, the burden of success. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
101

Bowen, R. W. (1992). Introducing Japan into the Comparative Politics Curriculum.
Political Science and Politics, 25, 1, p.57-73.
Bridges, B. (1993). Japan: Hesitant Superpower. Research Institute for the Study of
Conflict and Terrorism.
Burks, A. W. (1991). Japan: a postindustrial power. US: Westview Press.
Burton, F. & Saelens, F. (1994). International Alliances as a Strategic Tool of
Japanese Electronic Companies. Japanese Multinationals. In Campbell, N. & Burton,
F. (eds.). The United States: Routledge.
Business Times, 21 August 2001.
Calder, K. E. (1988). Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability
in Japan, 1949-1986. The United States: Princeton University Press.
Cheol, H. P. (1998). Enduring Campaign Network in Tokyo Shitamachi District. In
Hideo, O. (ed.). How Electoral Reform Boomeranged. Tokyo: JCIE Press.
Cheol, H. P. (2001). Factional Dynamics in Japan’s LDP since Political Reform:
Continuity and Change. Asian Survey, (41), 3, p.428-461.
Christensen, R. V. (1994). Electoral Reform in Japan: How It Was Enacted and
Changes It May Bring. Asian Survey, (34), 7, p.589-605.
Christensen, R. V. (1996). The New Japanese Election Systems. Pacific Affairs, 69,
(1), p. 49-70.
Christensen, R. V. (2000). Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan.
The United States: University of Hawaii Press.
Clark, R, The Japanese Company, The United States: Yale University Press.
Collier, R. B. (1982). Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy,
1945-1975. The United States: Princeton University Press.
Cox, G. W. & Rosenbluth, F. (1993). The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions
in Japan, American Political Science Review 87, p.577-589.
Cox, G., Rosenbluth, F. & Thies, M. (1999). Electoral Reform and the Fate of
Factions: The Case of Japan’s LDP. British Journal of Political Sciences, (29), 1,
p.33-56.
Curtis, G.. L. (1975). Big business and political influence. In Vogel, E. F. (ed.).
Modern Japanese organization and decision making. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Curtis, G. L, (1988). The Japanese Way of Politics. Columbia: Columbia University
102

Press.
Curtis, G. L. (1999). The logic of Japanese politics: leaders, institutions, and the
limits of change. New York: Columbia University Press.
Daily Yomiuri (September 11, 1999). Money Politics Shake-up Vital.
Dekle, R. (1991). Defense Spending and Economic Performance. In Makin, J. H. &
Hellmann, D. C. (Ed.). Sharing World Leadership? A New Era for America and
Japan, The United States: American Enterprise Institute.
Donnelly, M. W.. Setting the Price of Rice: A Study in Political Decision making,
Pempel, T. J. (ed.). Political Making in Contemporary Japan. The United States:
Cornell University Press.
Drysdale, P. (ed.). Japanese Governance: Beyond Japan Inc. London and New York:
RoutledgeCuzon Press.
Easton, D (1957). An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems. World Politics,
(9), 3, 383-400.
Editorial comment in Japan Echo (1978) vol 5 (special issue), p.44.
Encarnation, D. J. (1992). Rivals Beyond Trade: America Versus Japan in Global
Competition. The United States: Cornell University Press.
Ernst, H. (1980). Technological Self-Reliance for Latin America: the OAS
Contribution. International Organization, (34), 4, p.553.
Ernest, B. H. (1980). Why Collaborate? Issue-Linkage and International Regimes.
World Politics, (32) (3), pp.357-405.
Flath, D. (2000). The Japanese Economy. The United Kingdom: Oxford University
Press.
Fouse, D. (2003). Japan Gets Serous about Missile Defense. Asia-Pacific Security
Studies, 2, 4, p.1-4.
Frieden, J. A. (1993). The United States, Japan, and Pacific Money and Finance. In
Frankel, J. A. & Kahler, M. (ed.). Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United
States in Pacific Asia. The United States: The University of Chicago Press
Frost, E. J. (1987). For Richer, For Poorer: The New U.S.-Japan Relationship. New
York: The Council on Foreign Relations.
Goldstein, J. S. (1999). International Relations. The United States: Longman.
Hadley, E.. Antitrust in Japan, The United States: Princeton University Press.
Haggard, S. & Simmons, B. A. (1987). Theories of International Regimes.
103

International Organization, (41) (3), 491-517.
Hane, M. (1996). Eastern Phoenix: Japan since 1945. The United States: Westview
press.
Higgins, B. (1939). Back to Mercantilism? Quarterly Review of Commerce
(pre-1986), 6, 3, p.139.
Hiroshi, M (1993). Political Reform: Much Ado About Nothing? Japan Quarterly, 40,
(3), p.246-257.
Horne, J. (1985). Japan’s Financial Market: Conflict and Consensus in Policymaking.
Australia & Boston: G. Allen & Unwin in association with the Australia-Japan
Research Centre, Australian National University
Hrebenar, R. J. & Nakamura, A. (2000). The Liberal Democratic Party: Still the most
powerful party in Japan. In Hrebenar, R. J. (eds). Japan’s new party system. US:
Westview Press.
Hrebenar, R. J. (1992). Japan’s party system. US: Westview Press.
Hrebenar, R. J. (2000). Rules of the Game: The Impact of the Electoral System on
Political Parties. In Hrebenar, R. J. (eds). Japan’s new party system. US: Westview
Press.
Hrebenar, R. J. (2000). The Komeito returns: The party of “Buddhist democracy”. In
Hrebenar, R. J. (eds). Japan’s new party system. US: Westview Press.
Hrebenar, R. J. (2000). The Money Base of Japanese Politics. In Hrebenar, R. J. (eds).
Japan’s new party system. US: Westview Press.
Hrebenar, R. J. (2000). Japan’s new party system. US: Westview Press.
Huntington, S. P. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. The United States:
Yale University Press.
Islam, S. (1993). Foreign Aid and Burdensharing: Is Japan Free Riding to a Co
prosperity Sphere in Pacific Asia. In Frankel, J. A. & Kahler, M. (ed.). Regionalism
and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia. The United States: The
University of Chicago Press.
Ito, M. (2002). The international Environment and Domestic Structure of Postwar
Japan’s Rapid Growth. In Hiroshi, S., Makoto, M. & Masamitsu, Y. (ed.). Japanese
Economy and Society under Pax-Americana. Japan: University of Tokyo Press.
Itoh, M. & Kiyono, K. (1998). Foreign Trade and Direct Investment. In Komiya, R.,
Okuno, M. & Suzumura, K. (ed.). Industrial Policy of Japan. The United States:
Academic Press.
Itoh, M. (2000). The Japanese Economy Reconsidered. The United States: Palgrave
104

Press.
Itoh, M., Kiyono, K., Okuno, M. & Suzumura, K. (1998). Industrial Policy as a
Corrective to Market Failures. In Komiya, R., Okuno, M. & Suzumura, K. (ed.).
Industrial Policy of Japan. The United States: Academic Press.
Jain, P. C, (1993). A New Political Era in Japan: The 1993 Election. Asian Survey,
33, (11), p, 1071-1082.
Jain, P. C. (1997). Party politics at the crossroads. In Jain, P. C. & Inoguchi, T. (eds).
Japanese Politics Today: Beyond Karaoke Democracy? New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Japan Economic Newswire. (April 08, 2004). Opposition parties slam Koizumi’s Iraq
policy after kidnapping.
Japan Ministry of Finance (1956). The Japanese Budget in Brief, 1955. Tokyo:
Ministry of Finance.
Japan Ministry of Finance (1997). The Japanese Budget in Brief, 1996. Japan:
Ministry of Finance.
Jayasuriya, K. (2003). Embedded mercantilism and open regionalism: The crisis of a
regional political project. Third World Quarterly, 24, 2; p. 339.
Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and Misperception in International Politics. The United
States: Princeton University Press.
Jervis, R. (1978). Cooperation under the Security Dilemma. World Politics, 30 (2),
167-174.
Jervis, R. (1982). Security Regime. International Organization, 36 (2), 357-378.
Johnson, C. (1997). Preconceptions vs. Observations, or the Contributions of
Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science.
Political Science and Politics, (30), (2), p. 170-174.
Johnson, S. (2000). Opposition politics in Japan: strategies under one-party
dominant regime. London & New York: Routledge.
Kakano, K. (1998). The Politics of Administrative Reform in Japan, 1993-1998.
Asian Survey, 38, (3), p.291-309.
Katz, R. (1998). The System that Soured: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese
Economic Miracle. The United States: An East Gate Book.
Katz, R. (1998). The System that Soured: Toward a Paradigm to Guide Japan Policy.
Washington Quarterly, 21, 4, p. 43-79.
Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1977). Power and Independence. The United Kingdom:
105

Little and Brown.
Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
Political Economy. The United States: Princeton University Press.
Kishimoto, K. (1988). Politics in modern Japan: development and organization.
Tokyo: Japan Echo Inc.
Kollner, P. (2004). Factionalism in Japan Political Parties Revisited or How Do
Factions in the LDP and the DPJ Differ? Japan Forum, 16 (1), p.87-109.
Kosai, Y. (1998). The Reconstruction Period. In Komiya, R., Okuno, M. & Suzumura,
K. (ed.). Industrial Policy of Japan. The United States: Academic Press.
Krasner, S. (1983). Structural Changes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in Krasner, S. D. (ed.). International Regimes. The United
States: Cornell University Press.
Krauss, E. S. (2003). The US, Japan, and Trade Liberalization: from Bilateralism to
Regional Multilateralism to Regionalism. The Pacific Review, 16, 3, p.307-329.
Kuo, C. T. & Y. T. (1992), The Politics of Japan’s Rice Trade, Journal of Northeast
Asia Studies. 11 (4), p. 36-50.
Lincoln, E. J. (1988). Japan: Facing Economic Maturity. The United Kingdom: The
Brookings Institution.
Linder, S. B. (1961). An Essay on Trade and Transformation. Stockholm: Almqvist
and Wicksell.
Makoto, I. (1990). The World Economic Crisis and Japanese Capitalism. The United
States: Macmillian Press Ltd.
Mason, M. (1992). American multinationals and Japan: the political economy of
Japanese capital controls, 1899-1980. The United States: Harvard University Press.
Masumi, J. (1995). Contemporary politics in Japan. US & UK: University of
California press.
McCraw, T. K. (1990). America versus Japan. The United States: Harvard Business
School Press.
McNeil, F. (1993). Rock of Sisyphus or Road to Reform. Journal of Democracy, 5, (3),
p.101-106.
Michitoshi, T. (1993). The July Revolution and Conservative Self-Renewal. Japan
Quarterly, 40, (4), p.387-394.
Mulgan, A. G. (2003). The Dynamics of Coalition Politics in Japan. In Amyx, J &
Ochiai, K. (July 2, 1999). Personal Interview by reporter.

106

O’ Donnell, G. A. (1973). Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Studies
in South American Politics. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of
California.
O’ Donnell, G. A. (1978). Reflections on the Pattern of Change in the
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State. Latin American Research Review, (13) (3),
pp.3-38
O’ Donnell, G. A. (1978). Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in
Comparative Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press.
OECD, (1976). Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programmes. Paris.
Ogura, S. & Yoshino, N (1998). The Tax System and the Fiscal Investment and Loan
Payment. In Komiya, R., Okuno, M. & Suzumura, K. (ed.). Industrial Policy of
Japan. The United States: Academic Press.
Okimoto, D. (1988). The Liberal-Democratic Party’s grand coalition. In Okimoto, D
& Rohlen, T. (eds). Inside the Japanese System: Readings on Contemporary Society
and Political Economy. US: Standard University Press.
Ono, T. (1997), Contemporary Poverty and Public Assistance Administration, Tokyo:
Minerva.
Otake, H. (1996). Power Shuffles and Policy Process. Tokyo: Japan Center for
International Exchange.
Oye, K & Wagner, R. H. (1983). The Theory of Games and the Problem of
International Cooperation. American Political Science Review, (70), pp.330-336.
Ozawa, T. (1996). The New Economic Nationalism and the ‘Japanese Disease’: The
Conundrum of Managed Economic Growth. Journal of Economic Issues, 30, 2, p.
483-491.
Ozawa, T. (2001a). The “Hidden” Side of the “Flying Geese” Catch-Up Model:
Japan's Dirigiste Institutional Setup and a Deepening Financial Morass. Journal of
Asian Economics 12, 4, p. 471-492.
Ozawa, T. (2001b). Putting the Pieces in Place for Japan's Economic Recovery. Asia
Pacific Issues, no. 57, East-West Center.
Pempel, T. J. (1992). Restructuring Social Coalitions: State, Society and Regime. In
Torstendahl R (ed.). State Theory and State History. The United Kingdom: Sage
Publications.
Pempel, T. J. (ed.).(1993) Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant
Regimes. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
Pempel, T. J. (1997). Regime Shift: Japanese Politics in Changing World Economy.
Journal of Japanese Studies, (23) (2), 333-361,

107

Pempel, T. J. (1977). Policymaking in Contemporary Japan. The United States:
Cornell University Press.
Pempel, T. J. (1998). Regime shift: comparative dynamics of the Japanese political
economy. New York: Columbia University Press.
Peng, I. (1997b). Impact of Social Welfare Reform in Japan since 1980, National
Social Policy Conference, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia, Social
Policy Research Centre.
Peng, I. (1997c). Impact of welfare reform in Japan since 1980: with focus on issues
of the ageing society, Japanese Journal of Social Services, 1, p.99-119.
Peng, I. (2000a). A Fresh Look at the Japanese Welfare State. Social Policy &
Administration, 34, 1, p. 87-115.

Rae, D. W. (1971). The Political Consequences of Electoral Law. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Reed, S. R. (2003). The 1993 election and the end of LDP one-party dominance. In
Reed, S. R. (ed.). Japanese Electoral Politics. London & New York: Routledge
Press.
Reed, S. R. (2003). The 1993 Election and the End of LDP One-party Dominance. In
Reed, S. R. (ed.). Japanese Election Politics. London and New York:
RoutledgeCurzon.
Richardson, B. M. (1997). Japanese Democracy. US: Yale University Press.
Rix, A (1989). Bureaucracy and Political Change in Japan. In Stockwin J. A. A.
(ed.). Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press.
Rothacher, A. (1993). The Japanese power elite. The United States: St. Martin’s
press Inc.
Roy, D. (2004). Stirring Samurai, Disapproving Dragon: Japan’s Growing Security
Activity and Sino-Japan Relations. Asian Affairs, 31, 2, p.86-101.
Puchala, D & Hopkins, R. (1983). International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive
Analysis. In Krasner, S. D. (ed.). International Regime. The United States: Cornell
University Press.
Shindo, E. (1989). Frozen in the Cold War: Another look at Japan-U.S. Fiction.
Japan Quarterly, 36, 1, p.275-281.
Shinoda, T. (1998). Japan’s Decision Making under the Coalition Governments.
Asian Survey, 38, (7), p.703-723.
Shuja, S. (2004). Japan’s Changing Security Posture and its Implications.
Contemporary Review, 285, 1665, p.206-212.
108

Spruce, W. E. (1994). Being Realistic about Japanese Competition: American Errors.
European Business Journal, 6, (1), p.32-39.
Stockwin, J. (1968). The Japanese socialist party and neutralism: a study of a
political party and its foreign policy. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
Stockwin, J. A. A. (2003). Electoral pressures for Change: The effect of Political
Reform. In Amyx, J & Drysdale, P. (ed.). Japanese Governance: Beyond Japan Inc.
London and New York: RoutledgeCuzon Press.
Takahashi, M. (1997). The Emergence of Welfare Society in Japan. The United
Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Takemoto, N (July 2, 1999). Personal Interview by reporter.
Tavlas, G. S. & Ozeki, Y. (1991). The Japanese Yen as an International Currency.
IMF Working Paper 91/2. Washington D. C.: International Monetary Fund.
Thayer, N. B. (1969). How the conservatives Rule Japan. Princeton. Princeton
University Press.
The Economist. 23 November 1996.
The Economist. 9 November 1996.
The Hong Kong Shanghai and Banking Corporation (HKSBC) (1989). Business
Profile Series: Japan. Hong Kong Bank: Hong Kong.
Thorn, R. S. (1987). The Rising Yen: The Impact of Japanese Financial
Liberalization on World Capital Markets. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian
Studies.
Tilton, M. (1996). Restrained Trade: Cartels in Japan’s Basic Materials Industries.
The United States: Cornell University Press.
Trevor, M (2001). Japan: Restless Competitor: The Pursuit of Economic Nationalism.
Japan: Japan Library.
Trevor, M. (2001). Japan: Restless competitor. Japan: Japan Library.
Tsuruta, T. (1998). The Rapid Growth Era. In Komiya, R., Okuno, M. & Suzumura,
K. (ed.). Industrial Policy of Japan. The United States: Academic Press.
Turner, P. (1991). Capital Flows in the 1980s: A Survey of Major Trends. BIS
Economic Paper no 30. Basle: Bank of International Settlements.
United Press International (July 23, 2004). DPJ’s Okada takes on Japan's LDP.
Uriu, R. M. (1996). Troubled Industries: Confronting Economic Change in Japan.
109

The United States: Cornell University Press.
Uriu, R. M. (2004). Japan in 2003. Asian Survey, 44, 1. p. 168-181.
Vanhanen, T. (1990). The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147
States, 1980-1988. New York: Crane Russak.
Vernon, R. (1966). International Investment and International Trade in the Product
Cycle, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 80, p.190-197.
Wada, J. (1996). The Japanese election system: Three analytical perspective. London
& New York: Routledge.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of International Politics. The United Kingdom:
Yamawaki, H. (1998). The Steel Industry. In Komiya, R., Okuno, M. & Suzumura, K.
(ed.). Industrial Policy of Japan. The United States: Academic Press.
Yanaga, C. (1968). Big Business in Japanese Politics. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Yoshimatsu, H. (2000). Internationalization Corporate Preferences and Commercial
Policy in Japan. The United Kingdom: Macmillan Press Ltd.
Young, O. (1980). International Regimes: Problems of Conception Formation. World
Politics, (32) (3), pp.331-356.

110

